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LH-th dtnfh fid Mill. $<Ld* & N9&4/ift4L*~ /JsmiofftM di>/n/n/Wto-
5*A4U> mwtfl P 
(t\y//)<t~A 4 V464ACy blears //) 4 ddL/f tl/£UMt-ff)& JtevaAfiCf 
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ff}A<l^i /)&/[)ifl&4.S £tftlfl<L&[-/i>tt/<L 4ty/4Sfi6A fly -//L &akl<3/ 
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ftrwvif Cbrpwfiibn ir MSW^TIM, My p&wtsft /nmf Mpt/y/& br 
?lnffrf<iS4- )Nifh s/iy mmim[tm^lfiuM /npncy9 Wbl^ pr tifttfs. 
WAPTMS Mil in/trust br miiytispt/ti Itvy h**lt n Mcdrf^ &//&/ 
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r ifi* I6C41 4ufhtrffics vj/fe hwcAofifreil *f -ffo. «fii£v~ „ 
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' 4MMn " }Hw.to»)A*di¥/fo[A/i< W/W>£ 4^^/ty 7 
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PptlMM\ (£ 4ntltfanlifll tde/rt&i ytmt>liTftwmfwertiinM 
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HJ/i-(r nef Mtpif-rih cfJuwu. dMff A#f ff fiuwtf 41 Ffo fUult it feM.i?ft& rfiMyiclmpnU AM<L ^jP^AW/ 
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h arms* »+ 
AM. Addendum fl \ da-hi d £6ujd df j/jik and hd^a/$ 
\t>\/<LMfn<urt d4Md U "iqfy-fjtf w/usi*: lb-y ftt Iff) (£> (<>Md-
Wflfidit>n4l //*f£). 46 If /£ 4 *6e>/l+MfLA& "fief dtAirtfuridA 
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 n no hi.ll £M/ U Mis^&tftm/Mmtrifhto M<esotyu% 
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(&}f& Fin-th 4n i/ffpffl*riw v/4/rffai in 44i<utft4li 64/>n&fk . 
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United States Constitution 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized. 
United States Constitution 
SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
United States Constitution 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah 
Article 1, Section 7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
1896 
Constitution of Utah 
Article 1, Section 13 
1
 It i I J. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be 
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, 
unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment The formation of 
the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the 
Legislature. 
January 1,1949 
Constitution of Utah 
Article 1, Section 24 
Sec 24« [Uniform operation of laws*] 
All laws of a general nature shall havr niiiloi in t >poi4ition. 
1896 
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Constitution of Utah 
Article 6, Section 28 
Sec 28. [Special privileges forbidden.] 
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private 
corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any 
municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or 
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform any municipal 
functions. 
November 7,1972 
Constitution of Utah 
Article 8, Section 1 
Sec. 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial 
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts as 
the Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, and 
such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of record. Courts not of record 
shall also be established by statute. 
July 1,1985 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 3BEArt. V, § 1 
History: Const. 1896. Cross-References. — Oaths of officers, 
Compiler's Notes. — The quotation marks § 52-1-1. 
at the end of this section have been carried in 
brackets in all compilations since Revised Stat-
utes of 1898. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS of oath form duly notarized by a deputy county 
clerk (a person duly authorized to administer 
Bond required in addition to oath. oaths) although he did not go through some 
Formal ritual unnecessary. formal ritual, with the raising of his right 
Supreme Court justices required to take oath.
 h a n d S t a t e v Mathews, 13 Utah 2d 391, 375 
Bond required in addition to oath. p 2 d 3 9 2 (1962). 
Statute requiring state treasurer to give
 S u p r e m e C o u r t j u s t i C es required to take 
bond is not unconstitutional on ground that oath 
Legislature could not add to requirement in
 J u d e g o f ^ S u p r e m e C o u r t subscribe to 
this section. State ex rel. Stain v. Chnstensen, . . . "°., , „„;„..;.,„ „„„„
 fu„;, J„* ; ^ 0 
SScS^ v^nLTiS! %£& i3diuS 
Formal ritual unnecessary. 794. For sequel to this case, see State ex rel. 
A deputy county recorder took the oath of Jugler v. Grover, 102 Utah 459, 132 P.2d 125 
office, required by this section, by his signing (1942). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Officers and Public Em-
ployees § 46. 
Key Numbers. — Officers *=» 36(1). 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 
1. [Three departments of government.] 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
History: Const. 1896. Legislative department, Utah Const., Art. 
Cross-References. — Executive depart- VI. 
ment, Utah Const., Art. VII. Municipal powers not delegable, Utah 
Judicial department, Utah Const., Art. VIII. Const., Art. VI, § 28. 
137 
Art. VIII, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 6. [Number of judges of district court and other 
courts — Divisions.] 
The number of judges of the district court and of other courts of record 
established by the Legislature shall be provided by statute. No change in the 
number of judges shall have the effect of removing a judge from office during a 
judge's term of office. Geographic divisions for all courts of record except the 
Supreme Court may be provided by statute. No change in divisions shall have 
the effect of removing a judge from office during a judge's term of office. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2; Cross-References. — Geographical divi-
1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R. 1. sions, § 78-1-2.1. 
Compiler's Notes. — Provisions similar to Statutory provisions, § 78-2-1 et seq 
those in this section were formerly found in Venue, § 78-13-1 et seq. 
Art. VIII, Sees. 5, 6, and 8. Former Sec. 16 es- / i A / / / / \/lH £J/^~ 
tablished the geographical composition of the / A I fl^\'0*\ fji^V^'f^tCtS 
Legislative increase in number of judges. Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Act of 1903, which increased number of Error §§ 1, 4. 
judges in third judicial district from three to C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 18 to 
four, empowered governor to appoint one judge 22; 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 291, 466. 
in and for such district, etc., held valid exeru§e^_A.L.R. — P1*ce of holding sessions of trial 
of legislative power. State ex rel. Breeden v. ^ ^ r t as afTecting validity of its proceedings, 18 
Lewis, 26 Utah 120, 72 P. 388 (1903). ' A^R.3d 572^ 
\ 
Key Numbers. — Courts <s= 156. 
Sec. 7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.] 
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years old, United States citizens, 
Utah residents for five years preceding selection, and admitted to practice law 
in Utah. Judges of other courts of record shall be at least 25 years old, United 
States citizens, Utah residents for three years preceding selection, and admit-
ted to practice law in Utah. If geographic divisions are provided for any court, 
judges of that court shall reside in the geographic division for which they are 
selected. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), those in this section were formerly found in 
S.J.R. 1. Art. VIII, Sec. 2. 
Compiler's Notes. — Provisions similar to 
Sec. 8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate 
approval.] 
When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the governor shall fill the 
vacancy by appointment from a list of at least three nominees certified to the 
governor by the Judicial Nominating Commission having authority over the 
vacancy. The governor shall fill the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the 
list of nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy within the time 
prescribed, the chief justice of the Supreme Court shall within 20 days make 
the appointment from the list of nominees. The Legislature by statute shall 
provide for the nominating commissions, composition and procedures. No 
member of the Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the Legislature 
192 
Constitution of Utah 
Article 11, Section 5 
Sec. 5. [Municipal corporations — To be created by general law — Right 
and manner of adopting charter for own government — Powers included.] 
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws. 
The legislature by general laws shall provide for the incorporation, organization and 
classification of cities and towns in proportion to population, which laws may be 
altered, amended or repealed Any incorporated city or town may frame and adopt a 
charter for its own government in the following manner 
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its members, 
and upon petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent of all votes 
cast at the next preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall forthwith provide 
by ordinance for the submission to the electors of the question: "Shall a commission 
be chosen to frame a charter?" The ordinance shall require that the question be 
submitted to the electors at the next regular municipal election. The ballot 
containing such question shall also contain the names of candidates for members of 
the proposed commission, but without party designation. Such candidates shall be 
nominated in the same manner as required by law fornomination of city officers. If a 
majority of the electors voting on the question of choosing a commission shall vote 
in the affirmative, then the fifteen candidates receiving a majority of the votes cast at 
such election, shall constitute the charter commission, and shall proceed to frame a 
charter. 
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the city 
at an election to be held at a time to be determined by the charter commission, which 
shall be not less than sixty days subsequent to its completion and distribution among 
the electors and not more than one year from such date. Alternative provisions may 
also be submitted to be voted upon separately. The commission shall make 
provisions for the distribution of copies of the proposed charter and of any 
alternative provisions to the qualified electors of the city, not less than sixty days 
before the election at which it is voted upon. Such proposed charter and such 
alternative provisions as are approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon, 
shall become an organic law of such city at such time as may be fixed therein, and 
shall supersede any existing charter and all laws affecting the organization and 
government of such city which are now in conflict therewith. Within thirty days 
after its approval a copy of such charter as adopted, certified by the mayor and city 
recorder and authenticated by the seal of such city, shall be made in duplicate and 
deposited, one in the office of the secretary of S tate and the other in the office of the 
city recorder, and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such charter. 
Amendments to any such charter may be framed and submitted by a charter 
commission in the same manner as provided for making of charters, or may be 
proposed by the legislative authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote thereof, or by 
petition of qualified electors to a number equal to fifteen per cent of the total votes 
cast for mayor on the next preceding election, and any such amendment may be 
submitted at the next regular municipal election, and having been approved by the 
majority of the electors voting thereon, shall become part of the charter at the time 
fixed in such amendment and shall be certified and filed as provided in case of 
charters. 
Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is hereby 
granted, the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and to 
adopt and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not 
in conflict with the general law, and no enumeration of powers in this constitution or 
any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of authority hereby 
conferred; but this grant of authority shall not include the power to regulate public 
utilities, not municipally owned, if any such regulation of public utilities is provided 
for by general law, nor be deemed to limit or restrict the power of the legislature in 
matters relating to State affairs, to enact general laws applicable alike to all cities of 
the State. 
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include the 
following: 
(a) To levy, dssoss and collect taxes and borrow money, within the limits 
prescribed by general law, and to levy and collect special assessments for benefits 
conferred. 
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, construct, own, 
maintain and operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and use; to acquire by 
condemnation, or otherwise, within or without the corporate limits, property 
necessary for any such purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by general law for 
the protection of other communities; and to grant local public utility franchises and 
within its powers regulate the exercise thereof. 
(C) To make local public improvements and to acquire by condemnation, or 
otherwise, property within its corporate limits necessary for such improvements; 
and also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for any such improvement and 
to sell or lease such excess property with restrictions, in order to protect and preserve 
the improvement 
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess property, or of 
any public utility owned by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or both, including, in 
the case of public utility, a franchise stating the terms upon which, in case of 
foreclosure, the purchaser may operate such utility, 
January 1,1933 
Constitution of Utah 
Article 8, Section 2 
Sec 2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law unconstitutional 
—Justice unable to participate.] 
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall consist of at least five 
justices. Thenumberofjustices may be changedbystatute,but no changeshall have 
the effect of removing a justice from office. A chief justice shall be selected from 
among the justices of the Supreme Court as provided by statute. The chief justice 
may resign as chief justice withoutresigning from the Supreme Court The Supreme 
Court by rule may sit and render final judgment either en banc or in divisions. The 
court shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this constitution or the 
Constitution of the United States, except on the concurrence of a majority of all 
justices of the Supreme Court. If a justice of the Supreme Court is disqualified or 
otherwise unable toparticipate in a cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the 
eventthechiefjustice is disqualified or unable to participate, the remainingjustices, 
shall call an active judge from an appellate court or the district court to participate in 
the cause. 
January 1,1945 
July 1,1985 
Constitution of Utah 
Article 8, Section 3 
Sec 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court] 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. 
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be 
exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary 
formeexei^iseofmeSupremeCoiirt'sjurisdictionormec^mpletedetenninationof 
any cause. 
July 1,1985 
419 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH Art. VII, § 20 
nor-elect who fails to take office, the powers and du-
ties of the Governor shall devolve upon the Lieuten-
ant Governor until the disability ceases or until the 
next general election, when the vacancy shall be 
filled bv election. If. during a vacancy in the office of 
Governor, the Lieutenant Governor resigns, dies, is 
removed, or becomes incapable of performing the du-
ties of the office, the President of the Senate shall act 
as Governor until the vacancy is filled or disability 
ceases. If in this case the President of the Senate re-
signs, dies, is removed, or becomes incapable of per-
forming the duties of the office, the Speaker of the 
House shall act as Governor until the vacancy is 
filled or disability ceases. While performing the du-
ties of the Governor as provided in this section, the 
Lieutenant Governor, the President of the Senate, or 
the Speaker of the House, as the case may be, shall be 
entitled to the salary' and emoluments of the Gover-
nor, except in cases of temporary disability. 
The disability of the Governor or person acting as 
Governor shall be determined by either a written dec-
laration transmitted to the Supreme Court by the 
Governor stating an inability to discharge the powers 
and duties of the office or by a majority of the Su-
preme Court on joint request of the President of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives. Such determination shall be final and conclu-
sive. Thereafter, when the Governor transmits to the 
Supreme Court a written declaration that no disabil-
ity exists, the Governor shall resume the powers and 
duties of the office unless the Supreme Court, upon 
joint request of the President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, or upon its 
own initiative, determines that the Governor is un-
able to discharge the powers and duties of the office. 
The Lieutenant Governor shall then continue to dis-
charge these powers and duties as acting Governor. 
The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to de-
termine all questions arising under this section. 1979 
Sec. 12. [Board of Pardons and Parole — Ap-
pointment — Powers and procedures 
— Governor's powers and duties — 
Legislature's powers.! 
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. 
The Governor shall appoint the members of the board 
with the consent of the Senate. The terms of office 
shall be as provided by statute. 
12) fa) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by major-
ity vote and upon other conditions as provided by 
statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures 
and restitution orders, commute punishments, 
and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases 
except treason and impeachments, subject to reg-
ulations as provided by statute 
(b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may 
not be remitted and a commutation, parole, or 
pardon mav not be trranted except after a full 
hea ring before the board, in open session, and 
after previous notice of the time and place of the 
hearing has been given. 
fc> The proceedings and decisions of the hoard, 
the reasons therefor in each case, and the dissent 
of any member who may disagree shall be re-
corded and filed as provided by statute with all 
papers used upon the hearing. 
^ lai The Governor may grant respites or re-
prieves in all cases of convictions for offenses 
against the state except treason or conviction on 
l rnpeachment. These respites or reprieves may 
not extend beyond the next session of the board. 
At that session, the board shall continue or deter-
mine the respite or reprieve, commute the pun-
ishment, or pardon the offense as provided in this 
section. 
(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Gover-
nor may suspend execution of the sentence until 
the case is reported to the Legislature at its next 
annual general session, when the Legislature 
shall pardon or commute the sentence, or direct 
its execution. If the Legislature takes no action 
on the case before adjournment of that session, 
the sentence shall be executed. 1992 
Sec. 13. (Repealed.1 1992 
Sec. 14. (Duties of Lieutenant Governor.! 
The Lieutenant Governor shall: 
(1) serve on all boards and commissions in lieu 
of the Governor whenever so designated by the 
Governor; 
(2) perform such duties as may be delegated by 
the Governor; and 
(3) perform other duties as may be provided by 
statute. 1992 
Sec. 15. (Duties of State Auditor and State 
Treasurer.! 
(1) The State Auditor shall perform financial post 
audits of public accounts except as otherwise provided 
by this Constitution. 
12) The State Treasurer shall be the custodian of 
public moneys. 
(3) Each shall perform other duties as provided by 
statute. 1992 
Sec. 16. (Duties of Attorney General.! 
The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of 
the State officers, except as otherwise provided by 
this Constitution, and shall perform such other duties 
as provided by law. 1979 
Sec. 17. [Repealed.1 1986 
Sec. 18. (Compensation of state and local offi-
cers.J 
(1) The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, State Au-
ditor, State Treasurer, Attorney General, and any 
other state officer as the Legislature may provide, 
shall receive for their services a fixed and definite 
compensation as provided by law. 
(2) (a) The compensation provided for in Subsec-
tion (1) shall be in full for all services rendered 
by those officers in any official capacity or em-
ployment during their terms of office. 
(b» An officer may not receive for the perfor-
mance of any official duty any fee for personal 
use, but all fees fixed by the Legislature for the 
performance by any of them of any official duty 
shall be collected in advance and deposited with 
the appropriate treasury. 
(ci The Legislature may provide for the pay-
ment of actual and necessary expenses of those 
officers while traveling in the performance of of-
ficial duties. 1992 
Sec. 19. (Grants and commiss ions . ! 
Ail grants and commissions shall be in the name 
and by tht- authority of the State of Utah, sealed with 
the Great Seal of the State, signed by the Governor. 
and countersigned bv such officer as provided bv law. 
1979 
Sec. 20. IThe Great Seal.) 
There shall be a seal of the State, which shall be 
called "The Great Seal of the State of Utah." and 
shall be kept by such officer as provided by law. 1979 
Laws of Utah - 1992 
REPEALS: 
ARTICLE VII SEC 13 
ARTICLE XXI, SEC 1 
ARTICLE XXI, SEC 2 
Be it revolted bv the Legislature of the state of Utah, 
tu o-thirds of all members elected to each of the tu o 
houses toting in faior thereof 
Sect ion 1. It is proposed to amend Article 
VI, Sec. 32, Utah Const i tut ion, to read: 
Sec 32 [Appointment of additional emplovees — 
Legal counsel ] 
<1> The Legislature may appoint temporary or 
permanent nonmember emplovees for work during 
and between sessions! including independently 
(2) The Legislature mav appoint legal counsel 
which shall provide and control all legal services for 
the Legislature [except as the Legislature by low 
shall authorize performance thereof by the attorney 
general] unless otherwise provided by statute 
Sec t ion 2. It is proposed to amend Article 
VII, Sec. 1, Utah Const i tut ion, to read: 
Sec 1 [Executive Department officers — Terms, 
residence, and duties ) 
(1) The elective constitutional officers of the Ex 
ecutive Department shall consist of Governor Lieu-
tenant Governor State Auditor State Treasurer, 
and Attorney General!, each of whom]_ 
(2) Each officer shall 
(a) hold office for four year&l ] beginning on the 
first Monday of January next after their election! 
The officers of the Executive Department,! 
(b) during their terms of office! shall 1 reside with-
in the state, and [shall keep the public records, 
books and papcro aa provided by law They ohalll 
(c) perform such duties as are prescribed b> this 
Constitution and as provided by [law] statute 
Sect ion 3. It is proposed to amend Article 
VII, Sec. 2, Utah Const i tut ion, to read: 
Sec 2 [Election of officers — Governor and Lieu 
tenant Governor elected jointly j 
(1) The officers provided for in Section {eneof-tkts 
artielel 1_ shall be elected bv the qualified voters of 
the state at the time and place of voting for members 
of the Legislature!-€tfvd4he-pefaonsl The candi-
dates respective!) having the highest number of 
votes cast for the office voted for shall be electedl 
but tfl If two or more is4vall) candidates have an 
equal and the highest number of votes for anv one of 
hatdl thie offices the two houses of the eiMa 
turei | at its next sessionl I shall elect [forthwith! b> 
joint ballot one of Isueh -person** 1 those candidates 
for [ ^aid I that office 
^2) In the electionl I the names of the candidates 
for Governor and Lieutenant Governor for each po 
htical partv shall appear together on the ballot!,1 
and the votes cast for a candidate for Governor shall 
be considered as also cast for the candidate for UJH^ 
tenant Governor t«k 
Sect ion 4. It is p r o p o s e d to amend Article ' 1 
VII, Sec . 3, Utah Const i tut ion, to read* ^ S 
Sec 3 [Qualifications of officers 1 -i 
U) To be eligible for the office of Governor or UeiK 
tenant Governor a person shall fhnvo "Mnmcdtki 
etgc of thirty 1 be 30 years of age or older at thetimeof 
election 
(2] To be eligible for the office of Attorney General 
a person shnllf nt thMim^ftfrlrrtion, hnvr nUuined 
fc^cage of twentv five] be 25 > ears of age or older i t 
the time of election, [eel admitted to practice before 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and [be] in 
good standing at the b2r " • Vl * 
(3) To be eligible for the office of State Auditor 
State Treasurer a person shall be 25 years of agoof^ 
older at the time of election " "~ \ * * f 
'*¥§ 
<4) No person [shall bcl is eligible to any oftheoj^ 
fices provided for in Section 1 [of thio article J unlet**] 
at the time of election that person is a qualified vStftfj 
and [shall have] has been a resident citizen o f lwt 
state for five years next preceding the election?^*] 
Sec t ion 5. It is p r o p o s e d to amend Article v * *  
VII, Sec . 5, Utah Const i tut ion, to read: £&* 
Sec 5 [Executive power vested in Governor *i-] 
Duties — Legal counsel ] 
(1) The execut ive power of the state shall be vested 
m the Governor!TJ who shall see that the laws are 
faithfully executed »* »<' 
« 
(2) The Governor shall transact all executiveb\ 
ness with the officers of the government, civil 
military, and may require information in writanjM 
from the officers of the Executive Department, asg^ 
from the officers and managers of state inst i tut ion 
upon any subject relating to the condition, managij^ 
ment, and expenses of their respective offices aj)jjU 
mstitutions[r«ndl The Governor may at any tTO|j 
when the Legislature is not in sessiontr^wayj, jvj 
deemed necessary, appoint a committee to inv95$Sjrj 
gate and report to the Governor upon the conditjop» 
of any executive office or state institution , ^ j 
(3) The Governor shall communicate by message 
the condition of the state to the Legislature at* ^ 
I regular 1 annual general session!,) and recomm^p^ 
such measures as may be deemed expedient <F ^ 
(4) The Governor may appoint legal counseUoajfr-
vise the Governor *<tik\ 
Sect ion 6. It is proposed to amend Article ^ 
VII, Sec. 12, Utah Const i tut ion, to read: ^ -
Sec 12 [Board of Pardons and Parole — A P P ^ 
ment — Powers and procedures — Governor s pow^ 
er s and duties — Legislature's powers 1 
[Until otherwise provided-fey 4«w-
tkrettees-of-thc Supreme Court-an^M^ 
A > *»W>r>ll J->/•««-./->».••.«^^> 1 
c*« 9 f t t x f t v U M a t l t U M J ) 
< 1) There is created a Board of Pardons! " • - ^ J J 
*A-^whe^, -m<?kidH^^ rijj 
A 
$ 
**&& 
norj. I shall appoint the members of the board with 
the consent of the Senate The terms of office shall 
be as provided by statute. 
(2Ha)The Board of Pardons and Parole, by major- I 
ity vote and upon (s«eb I other conditions as j may be I 
e&tabkshedl provided by [the-Legrelaturel statute, 
m ay grant parole, remit fines, (etftdl forfeitures, and 
restitution orders, commute punishments, and j 
grant pardons after convictions, in all cases except ! 
treason and impeachments, subject to Isueh] regu-
lations as | may be) provided by I low, relative to-the 
(b) A fine lor], forfeiture (shatij, or restitution or-
der may not be remitted!-J and (no] a commutation, 
parole, or pardon may not be granted!, 1 except after 
a full hearing before the board, in open session, and I 
after previous notice of the time and place of [stiehj 
the hearing has been given. 
(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board, 
(with) the reasons therefor in each case, [together 
with] and the dissent of any member who may dis-
agree!;] shall be [reduced to writing,] recorded and 
filed as provided by s ta tute with all papers used 
upon the hearing!, in the office of such officer as pro-
vided by low], 
(3Xa) The Governor [oholl hove power to] may 
grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convictions 
for offenses against the state!,] except treason or 
conviction on impeachment!; but such]. These re-
spites or reprieves (shall] may not extend beyond 
the next session of the board [of Pardons; and such 
Boarol-J. At Isueh] that session, the board shall con-
tinue or determine (sueh] the respite or reprieve, (or 
they may] commute the punishment, or pardon the 
offense as 1 herein] provided in this section. 
<b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor 
jsholl hove the power to] may suspend execution of | 
the sentence!,] until the casetsholl bclis reported to 
the Legislature at its next (regular) annual general 
session, when the Legislature shall (either) par- | 
don(;) or commute the sentence, or direct its execu- J 
tionlrfmo! the Governor ohall comfmmieateio-the j 
Legislature a t each regular session, eaeheaseef re-
mission of fine of forfeiture, reprieve. eomrmrtattoa. | 
or-pordon granted since the last -previous—refroft, | 
stovmg^the name of the convict, the crime for whieh 
eoov+eteeVthe-9entenee and its date. 4he-dote of re-
 i 
mts5K»n:ewnmuiotion.pe-Fo!ort.-orref>ryove. wtthtlie j 
^»M)mt for grant*ng thesomerend-the objectnm^. rf i 
any: of -a-ny member- of-4he-beard-made -thereto I If I 
the Legislature takes no action on the case before J 
adjournment of that session, the sentence shall be j 
Wcuted I 
Section 7. It is p r o p o s e d to a m e n d Ar t ic le ' 
VII. Sec. 14, U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n , to r e a d : j 
Sec 14 ! Duties of Lieutenant Governor ) 
i 
The Lieutenant Governor shall: j 
' 1» serve on all boards and commissions in lieu of j 
the Governor whenever so designated by the Cover- j 
norL^halll; 
(2) perform such duties as may be delegated by t he 
Governor!,J; and jshaH] 
f3) perform j s«eh} other duties as may be provided 
by [lawj statute 
Sec t ion 8. It is proposed to a m e n d Article 
VII, Sec . 15, Utah Const i tut ion , to read: 
Sec. 15. (Duties of State Auditor and State Trea-
surer.] 
(1) The State Auditor shall perform financial post 
audits of public accounts!;] except as otherwise pro-
vided by this Constitution!, and the]. 
(2; The State Treasurer shall be the custodian of 
public moneys!; and eaeh]_ 
(3) Each shall perform [aueh] other duties as pro-
vided by I lew] statute. 
Sec t i on 9. It is proposed to a m e n d Artic le 
VII, Sec . 18, Utah Const i tut ion , to read: 
Sec. 18. [Compensation of s ta te and local officers.] 
(1) The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, S ta te Au-
ditor, State Treasurer, Attorney General, and [saeh] 
any other s tate [and District officers] officer as [pre-
vidcd for by law] the Legislature may provide, shall 
receive for their services a fixed and definite com-
pensation as [fixed] provided by law. 
(2 X a) The compensation provided for [said officers 
as provided in all laws cnaetcd pursuan t to this Con-
stitution, } in Subsection (1) shall be in full for all ser-
vices rendered by [said] those officers!, respective-~ 
\y-,} in any official capacity or employment during 
their ! respective] terms of office. 
(b) 1 Nosueh] An officer 1 shall] may not receive for 
the performance of any official duty any fee for per-
sonal use. but all fees fixed by (law J the Legislature 
for the performance by [either] any of them of any 
official duty!,] shall be collected in advance and de-
posited with the !State Treasurer monthly to the 
eredtt of the State ] appropriate treasury. 
<c; The Legislature may provide for the payment 
of actual and necessary expenses of | said] those offi-
cers while traveling in the performance of official 
duties 
S e c t i o n 10. It is p r o p o s e d to a m e n d Article 
VIII, Sec . 12, U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n , t o r e a d : 
Sec 12 [Judicial Council — Chief justice as ad-
ministrative officer — Legal counsel] 
(A! i 11 There is created a Judicial Council (ts-es-
tabl tshedj which shall adopt rules for the adminis-
tration of the courts of the state. 
«_2_» The Judicial Council shall consist of the chief 
justice of the Supreme Court, as presiding officer, 
and I sueh I other justices, judges, and other persons 
as provided by statute There shall be at least one 
representative on the Judicial Council from each 
court established by the Constitution or by s tatute . 
<_3 > The chief justice of the Supreme Court shall be 
the chief administrative officer for the courts and 
1525 
Art I, § 12 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Workmen s Compensation Act is not invalid 
because it delegates to industrial commission 
the power to hear, consider and determine con-
troversies between litigants as to ultimate lia-
bility, or their property rights Utah Fuel Co 
v Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P 122 
(1920) 
Dependents of employee killed by acts of 
third party, a stranger to employment, are not 
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Is-
sues 1970 Utah L Rev 248 
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment Next 
Move — Due Process7 1971 Utah L Rev 266 
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Counsel in Prison Disciphn 
ary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L Rev 275 
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L Rev 
319 
Outdoor Sports and Torts An Analysis of 
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L 
Rev 47 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 
Utah L Rev 129 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am Jur 2d Constitu-
tional Law §§ 613 to 617 
C.J.S. — 16D C J S Constitutional Law 
§§ 1428 to 1437 
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants, 
statutory provisions, § 77 1-6 
limited to recovery under Workmen s Compen 
sation Act exclusively unless thev have as 
signed their rights to insurance carrier Robin 
son v Union Pac R R , 70 Utah 441, 261 P 9 
(1927) 
Cited in Wrolstad v Industrial Comm n, 786 
P 2d 243 (Utah Ct App 1990) 
criminal trial in order to preserve confidential 
lty of undercover witness, 54 A L R 4th 1156 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or 
defendant, 55 ALR4th 1170 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to avoid intimidation of witness 55 
ALR4th 1196 
False light invasion of privacy—defenses 
and remedies, 57 A L R 4th 244 
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or other-
wise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as 
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57 
A L R 4th 404 
Libel or slander defamation by statement 
made in jest, 57 A L R 4th 520 
Defamation designation as scab, 65 
ALR4th 1000 
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfer-
ing with prospective civil action, as actionable, 
70 A L R 4th 984 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law 
•» 322, 324, 327, 328 
Sec, 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put m jeopardy for the same offense 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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[259] CITIES, TOWNS AND SUBDIVISIONS Ch. 48 
10-3-919. Powers, duties and obligations of police chief, marshal and 
their assistants in cities of the third class and towns. 
The chief of police, marshals and their assistants in cities of the third 
class and towns shall have all of the powers, rights and duties respectively 
conferred on such officers in sections 10-3-913 through 10-3-915. 
10-3-920. Bail commissioner—Powers and duties. 
The mayor of any city of the third class or town, by and with the consent 
of the council, and the board of commissioners in cities of the first and 
second class, may appoint one or more discreet persons to be known as bail 
commissioners, who shall have and exercise all the powers which are or may 
be conferred by law upon justices of the peace or judges of the city court in 
respect to fixing of bail of persons arrested within the corporate limits of the 
municipality for misdemeanors under the laws of the state or for violation of 
the municipal ordinance and to take, approve or declare forfeited any bail. 
Any person who has been ordered by any bail commissioner to give bail may 
deposit the amount thereof in money with the bail commissioner. 
10-3-921. Fines—Collection by bail commissioner—Accounting. 
Bail commissioners shall have the power to collect and give receipts for 
monies tendered in payment of fines of any person serving a sentence in 
default of the payment of a fine. All monies collected by bail 
commissioners shall be accounted for at least every seven days to the clerk 
of the court where the court exists, and in municipalities where courts do not 
exist the accounting shall be made to the municipal treasurer, or in cases 
arising under state laws, to the county treasurer. 
10-3-922. Term of bail commissioners—Salary—Bond and oath. 
Commissioners appointed pursuant to section 10-3-920 shall serve at the 
pleasure of the governing body and mayor appointing them. Before entering 
upon their duties, bail commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath to 
faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of their office and shall give a 
bond to the municipality wherein they are appointed, with two good and 
sufficient individual sureties or with a single corporate surety, to be 
approved by the governing body and mayor appointing them which bond 
shall be in the sum of at least for cities $2,500, and $1,000 for towns, 
conditioned on the faithful performance of their duties as bail 
commissioners, and that they account for and turn over to the clerk of the 
court or to the treasurer of their respective municipality, as the case may be, 
at the times provided by law, all monies, bonds, property and records coming 
into their hands as bail commissioners, and that at the expiration of their 
term of office they will surrender and turn over all funds, bonds, property 
and records coming into their hands and pertaining to their office. Suit on 
an> bond may be brought by any county, municipality or person injured. 
10-3-923. City and town justices of the peace—Vacancy and 
appointment. 
D 
Ch. 48 CITIES, TOWNS AND SUBDIVISIONS [260] 
If a vacancy occurs in the office of a city or town justice, the mayor, by 
and with the consent of the council, shall forthwith fill the vacancy by 
appointment for the unexpired term. The person appointed shall qualify in 
the same manner as a city or town justice, and shall have and exercise all 
the powers conferred by law on city or town justices. 
10-3-924. Disqualification. 
\^"1A^ In case any city or town J u s t i c e sha11 for any reason ** unaDle or 
i *y disqualified to perform the duties of his office, or shall be absent, the mayor 
f /A shall appoint another justice of the peace residing within the county to act 
/ ,1 during the period of disability or absence, as city or town justice of the peace 
S pro tempore, and he shall have the powers and shall discharge the duties of 
the city or town justice in the same manner and to the same extent as the 
city or town justice might have done. 
10-3-925. Compensation of justice. 
A justice of the peace shall receive such compensation as the governing 
body may by ordinance provide. 
10-3-926. Payment of fees, fines or penalties to treasurer. 
All fees, fines or penalties received by a municipal justice of the peace 
shall be transferred to the municipal treasurer within seven days of receipt 
by the justice of the peace. 
10-3-927. Appointment of manager. 
The governing body of any city or town may by ordinance establish a 
manager form of government and appoint any person to be known as the 
manager. 
10-3-928. Term of office. 
The manager shall serve at the pleasure of the governing body except 
that the governing body may employ the manager for a term not to exceed 
three years. The term of employment may be renewed at any time. Any 
person serving as manager of a municipality under this section may be 
removed with or without cause by a majority vote of the governing body. 
10-3-929. Duties of the manager. 
The governing body shall, by ordinance or resolution, prescribe the 
powers, duties and obligations of the manager. 
10-3-930. Legislative powers and official position of the mayor not 
delegated. 
The legislative and judicial powers of the mayor, his position as chairman 
of the governing body and any ex-officio position the mayor shall hold shall 
not be delegated to the manager. 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-la-l 
cases shall be as pre-
ke Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Jes as may be adopted by the Su-
1980 
[Effective until January 1, 
p( this act: 
faction" means the proceedings 
on is charged, accused, and 
jfor a public offense. 
§e£$* means an accusation in writ-
*WOY a grand jury to the district 
' a person with a public offense. 
|tipn" means an accusation, in 
tig a person with a public offense 
ented and signed by a prosecuting 
F filed in the office of the clerk where 
IjSn is commenced or subscribed and 
^complaining witness before a mag-
r/offense is a class B misdemeanor or 
Unse not requiring approval of the 
^attorney. 
_£trate" means a justice of the Su-
Tr$ a judge of the district courts, a 
Pjuvenile courts, a judge of the circuit 
udge of the justice courts, or a judge of 
^ a t e d b y l a w . 1990 
•^ttefinitions [Effective January 
ft 
1, 
of this act: 
iminal action" means the proceedings 
a person is charged, accused, and 
trial for a public offense. 
fdictment" means an accusation in writ-
ented by a grand jury to the district 
ftg a person with a public offense. 
formation" means an accusation, in 
^charging a person with a public offense 
^presented and signed by a prosecuting 
Hy and filed in the office of the clerk where 
^osScution is commenced or subscribed and 
xSJby a complaining witness before a mag-
_ithe offense is a class B misdemeanor or 
er offense not requiring approval of the 
piting attorney. 
"Magistrate" means a justice or judge of a 
i of record or not of record or a commissioner 
| | c n a court appointed in accordance with Sec-
"^8-3-31. 1991 
^Conviction to precede pun i shment 
>erson shall be punished for a public offense 
d i e t e d in a court having jurisdiction. 1980 
Prosecuting party. 
iminal action for any violation of a state stat-
pHall be prosecuted in the name of the state of 
IPC Criminal action for violation of any county or 
3Spal ordinance shall be prosecuted in the name 
overnmental entity involved. 2980 
p C $ l , Rights of d e f e n d a n t 
ffi^fc criminal prosecutions the defendant is enti-
^ 0 ( a ) To appear in person and defend m person 
&- jpr by counsel; 
^ ^ (b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed 
^ a g a i n s t him; 
>!£*: (c) To testify in his own behalf; 
§£&>. (d) To be confronted by the witnesses against 
S> him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district where the offense is 
alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with 
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 
30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for 
the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those 
rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband nor a husband against his 
wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by ver-
dict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no con-
test, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, 
upon a judgment by a magistrate. 1980 
77-1-7. Dismissal without trial — Custody or 
discharge of de fendant 
(1) (a) Further prosecution for an offense is not 
barred if the court dismisses an information or 
indictment based on the ground: 
(i) there was unreasonable delay; 
(ii) the court is without jurisdiction; 
(iii) the offense was not properly alleged 
in the information or indictment; or 
(iv) there was a defect in the impaneling 
or the proceedings relating to the grand jury, 
(b) The court may make orders regarding cus-
tody of the defendant pending the filing of new 
charges as the interest of justice may require. 
Otherwise, the defendant shall be discharged and 
bail exonerated. 
(2) An order of dismissal based upon unconstitu-
tional delay in bringing the defendant to trial or upon 
the statute of limitations is a bar to any other prose-
cution for the offense charged. 1990 
CHAPTER l a 
PEACE OFFICER DESIGNATION 
Section 
77-la-l. 
77-la-2. 
77-la-3. 
77-la-4. 
77-la-5. 
77-la-6. 
77-la-7. 
77-la-8. 
77-la-9. 
Peace officer. 
Correctional officer. 
Reserve and auxiliary officers. 
Special function officers. 
Federal peace officers — Authority. 
Basic training requirements for position 
— Peace officers temporarily in the 
state. 
Responsibility for training — Certifica-
tion. 
Retirement. 
References in other provisions. 
77-la-l . Peace officer. 
(1) "Peace officer" means any employee of a police 
or law enforcement agency which is part of or admin-
istered by the state or any of its political subdivisions, 
and whose duties consist primarily of the prevention 
78-4-5 JUDICIAL CODE 
state being divided into circuits as provided in this 
chapter. 1977 
78-4-5. Jurisdiction — Exclusive and concur-
rent [Effective until January 1, 1992]. 
(1) (a) Circuit courts have jurisdiction over all 
classes of misdemeanors and infractions involv-
ing persons 18 years of age and older and may 
impose the punishments prescribed for these of-
fenses. The judge of the circuit court has the au-
thority and jurisdiction of a magistrate including 
the conducting of proceedings for the preliminary 
examination to determine probable cause, com-
mitment prior to trial, or the release on bail of 
persons charged with criminal offenses. 
(b) When a complaint may be commenced be-
fore a magistrate under Section 77-3-1 or an ar-
rested person is to be taken before a magistrate 
under Section 77-7-18, the complaint may be 
commenced or the arrested person may be taken 
before any circuit court judge in the county or the 
justice court judge in the county in whose pre-
cinct the offense occurred, unless both are un-
available; then before any justice court judge 
having jurisdiction. 
(c) All complaints fpr offenses charged under 
Title 41 except offenses charged under Article 5, 
Chapter 6, Title 41, shall be filed in the munici-
pal justice court or the county justice court where 
the offense occurred if those justice courts exist 
and have jurisdiction of the offenses. 
(2) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdic-
tion of all cases arising under or by reason of the 
violation of any county ordinance involving persons 
18 years of age or older, but if a county justice court 
exists in the county, jurisdiction is concurrent. 
(3) (a) The circuit court has exclusive original ju-
risdiction of all cases arising under or by reason 
of the violation of any municipal ordinance in-
volving persons 18 years of age and older in those 
municipalities in which a municipal department 
of the circuit court exists or has been created. 
(b) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdic-
tion ^ with county justice courts over violations of 
municipal ordinances charging persons 18 years 
of age and older with driving under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs, driving with a blood alcohol 
content of .08% or higher, or reckless driving in 
municipalities within a county precinct in which 
a municipal justice court does not exist. 
(c) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdic-
tion with municipal justice courts over violations 
of state statutes in municipalities where a mu-
nicipal justice court exists. 
(4) The circuit court has jurisdiction over traffic 
offenses committed by persons older than 16 and 
younger than 18 years of age except those offenses 
exclusive to the juvenile court under Subsection 
(lXc), Subsection 78-3a-16(l)(a), and Section 
78-5-105. The circuit court shall notify the juvenile 
court of a conviction of any person younger than 18 
years of age of an offense under Section 78-3a-39.5. 
(5) The circuit court has authority to take the juve-
nile's driver license and return it to the Driver Li-
cense Division, Department of Public Safety, for sus-
pension under Section 41-2rl28. 
(6) Circuit court judges may transfer cases within 
the court's jurisdiction under Subsection (4) to the 
juvenile court for postjudgment proceedings accord-
ing to rules of the Judicial Council. 1990 
Circuit court jurisdiction , 
diction in circuit court w h e n no jij 
court — Jurisdiction retained unti 
fective date [Effective January l£i§ 
Circuit courts have jurisdiction over class A C 
meanors. Circuit courts have jurisdiction over < 
misdemeanors classified by Article 5, Chapter! 
41, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless ] 
ordinances that comply with the requirement 
tion 41-6-43, and class B misdemeanors classiiif 
any title other than Title 41. Circuit courts 3 
risdiction over all related misdemeanors arisil 
of a single criminal episode. When a justice i 
given jurisdiction of a criminal matter and theti 
justice court with territorial jurisdiction, the? 
court shall have jurisdiction. The circuit coti 
retain jurisdiction over cases properly filed ufl 
cuit court prior to January 1, 1992. The circui? 
shall have jurisdiction as provided 
10-3-923. 
78-4-6. Municipal department of circuit < 
Report to court administrate;! 
pealed effective January 1, 19 
(1) (a) The governing body of any mu 
may by ordinance establish a municipal^ 
ment of the circuit court. A circuit court5? 
capacity is the Municipal department^ 
(naming the circuit) circuit court for (11 
municipality), Utah." , 
(b) A circuit court established under Jj 
tion (lXa), for which funding is not ava 
time of establishment, may not be imple 
until funding is provided for the courO 
(c) If the governing body of a municipa 
tablishes a municipal department of thejj 
court, a municipal justice court judge mav, 
appointed or elected. The circuit judges i 
cessors of the justice court judges actio 
municipality where municipal dep 
the circuit court are established. 
(2) (a) Governing bodies of municipalitie 
lishing municipal departments of the 
court may vacate the establishment of thl 
court by ordinance and return to a municj| 
tice court. 
(b) If a governing body establishes 
court or returns to a justice court systemfj 
cause the Office of the State Court Ad 
to be notified in writing within 30 daysd 
fact. 
Up 
78-4-7. Civil jurisdiction — Exception 
tive until January 1, 1992]; ' 
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction^! 
and equity, in all matters if the sum claimej 
than $10,000, exclusive of court costs, exp 
(1) in actions to determine the titf 
property, but not excluding actions 
mechanics' liens; 
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody| 
ternity; 
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform 
Code; 
(4) in actions to review the decisidij 
state administrative agency, board, cou 
mission, or hearing officer; 
(5) in actions seeking remedies in t n | 
extraordinary writs; and 
(6) in all other actions where, by stati 
diction is exclusively vested in the distfl 
or other trial or appellate court. 
Sew.<- <si^-*«-r} 
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PART 2 
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
76-6-201. Definit ions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, 
means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or 
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accom-
modation of persons or for carrying on business therein 
and includes: 
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of 
the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected 
with the structure or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occu-
pied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not 
a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon 
premises when the premises or any portion thereof at the 
time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public 
and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged 
to enter or remain on the premises or such portion 
thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of 
the actor. 1973 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any 
person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the 
second degree. 1973 
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempt-
ing, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or 
another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dan-
gerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the 
same definition as under Section 76-1-601. 1989 
76-6-204. Burglary of a veh ic l e — Charge of other 
offense. 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with 
intent to commit a felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a 
vehicle. 
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection 
(1) shall not preclude a charge for a commission of any other 
offense. 1973 
76-6-205. Manufacture or possess ion of instrument for 
burglary or theft. 
Any person who manufactures or possesses any instrument, 
tool, device, article, or other thing adapted, designed, or 
commonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission of 
any offense under circumstances manifesting an intent to use 
or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the 
commission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 1973 
76-6-206. Criminal trespass . 
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion of 
the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circum-
stances not amounting to burglary as defined in Section 
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 7-6-204: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any 
person or damage to any property, including the use 
of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft 
or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will 
cause fear for the safety of another, or 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he 
enters or remains on property as to which notice against 
entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the 
owner or someone with apparent authority to act for 
the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed 
to exclude intruders; 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to 
the attention of intruders. 
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2Xa) is a class C misde-
meanor unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which 
event it is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the: 
(a) property was open to the public when the actor 
entered or remained; and 
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with 
the owner's use of the property. 1996 
PARTS 
ROBBERY 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or 
attempts to take personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against 
his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or 
fear of immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing 
a theft" if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission 
of theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 1995 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered 
to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
1994 
PART 4 
THEFT 
76-6-401. Definit ions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real 
78-5-128 JUDICIAL CODE 
(5) The Judicial Council shall include in its annual report a list of all 
justice court judges in the state showing those that are certified under this 
section and those not. 
History: C. 1953, 78-5-127, enacted by L. inar, Rule 9-103. Rules of Judicial Administra-
1989, ch. 157, & 36. tion 
Judicial Council, Utah Const., Art VIII, Sec. 
1 *?• & 7ft 1 01 
§ 51 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. judicial Conduct Commission, Utah Const., 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 157, 
 s t  t ff ti   l  , . 
Cross-References. — Annual training sem- Art. VIII, Sec. 13; § 78-3-27. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Justices of C.J.S. — 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace § 7. 
the Peace §§ 6, 8. Key Numbers. — Justices of the Peace «=» 5. 
78-5-128. Determination of compensation and limits — Sal-
ary survey — Limits on secondary employment. 
(1) (a) Every justice court judge shall be paid a fixed compensation deter-
mined by the governing body of the respective municipality or county 
taking into consideration recommendations of the office of the state court 
administrator as provided in Subsection (2), but in no case may the salary 
for a justice court judge be an amount greater than 75% of the salary of a 
circuit court judge. 
(b) The compensation shall be comprised of a monthly salary and shall 
be computed upon the number of hours, days, or other periods of time that 
the justice court judge is to be available to perform all judicial functions. 
(2) (a) The state court administrator with the approval of the Judicial 
Council shall survey areas of the state relating to the functions and activ-
ities of the justice courts, taking into consideration the diverse economic 
factors of the various localities of the justice courts, and develop recom-
mended monthly salaries. These recommendations shall be furnished to 
the governing bodies of the municipalities and the counties to assist them 
in determining salaries. 
(b) The state court administrator may make studies concerned with the 
economic as well as administrative feasibility to encourage the various 
political subdivisions to utilize the same person or persons to act as justice 
court judges for their several jurisdictions and to assist political subdivi-
sions desiring to enter into agreements for that purpose. 
(3) A justice court judge may not appear as an attorney in any criminal 
matter in a federal, state, or justice court or appear as an attorney in any 
justice court or in any juvenile court case involving conduct which would be 
criminal if committed bv an adult. 
(4) A justice court judge may not hold any office or employment including 
contracting for services in any justice agency of state government or any 
political subdivision of the state including law enforcement, prosecution, 
criminal defense, corrections, or court employment. 
(5) A justice court judge may not hold any office in any politicaTpafty "Of" 
organization engaged in any political activity or serve as an elected official in 
state government or any political subdivision of the state. 
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(2) The court may appoint an attorney guardian ad litem, when it considers 
it necessary and appropriate, to represent the best interest of the child in all 
related proceedings conducted in any state court involving the alleged abuse, 
child sexual abuse, or neglect. 
(3) The attorney guardian ad litem shall be appointed in accordance with 
and meet the requirements of Sections 78-3a-911 and 78-3a-912. 
(4) If an attorney guardian ad litem has been appointed for the child by any 
court in the state in any prior proceeding or related matter, the court may 
continue that appointment or may reappoint that attorney guardian ad litem, 
if still available, to act on behalf of the child. 
(5) The court is responsible for all costs resulting from the appointment of 
an attorney guardian ad litem and shall use funds appropriated by the 
Legislature for the guardian ad litem program to cover those costs. 
(6) If the court appoints a guardian ad litem attorney pursuant to this 
section or Section 78-3a-912, the court may assess all or part of those attorney s 
fees, court costs, paralegal, staff, and volunteer expenses against the minor's 
parent or parents in an amount that the court determines to be just and 
appropriate. The court may not assess those fees or costs against a parent who 
is found to be impecunious. 
(7) An attorney guardian ad litem appointed in accordance with the require-
ments of this section and Sections 78,-3a-911 and 78-3a-912 is, when serving in 
the scope of duties of an attorney guardian ad litem, considered an employee 
of this state for purposes of indemnification under the Governmental Immu-
nity Act. 
History: C. 1953, 78-7-9, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
1992, ch. 213, § 5; 1993, ch. 175, § 3; 1994, ment, effective July 1,1997, rewrote Subsection 
ch. 157, $ 4; 1995, ch. 68, § 2; 1996, ch. 1, (6). 
§ 89; 1997, ch. 194, § 4. 
78-7-17.5, Authority of magistrate. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a magistrate as defined in Section 
77-1-3 shall have the authority to: 
(a) commit a person to incarceration prior to trial; 
(b) set or deny bail under Section 77-20-1 and release upon the payment 
of bail and satisfaction of any other conditions of release; 
(c) issue to any place in the state summonses and warrants of search 
and arrest and authorize administrative traffic checkpoints under Section 
77-23-104; 
(d) conduct an initial appearance in a felony; 
(e) conduct arraignments; 
(f) conduct a preliminary examination to determine probable cause; 
(g) appoint attorneys and order recoupment of attorney fees; 
(h) order the preparation of presentence investigations and reports; 
(i) issue temporary orders as provided by rule of the Judicial Council; 
and 
(j) perform any other act or function authorized by statute. 
(2) A judge of the justice court may exercise the authority of a magistrate 
specified in Subsection (1) with the following limitations: 
(a) a judge of the justice court may conduct an initial appearance, 
preliminary examination, or arraignment in a felony case as provided by 
rule of the Judicial Council; and 
(b) a judge of the justice court may not set bail in a capital or first degree 
felony nor deny bail in any case; and 
fT) £&unZjt Jus-rite. Court's /way / W /Lt/ia/^-t />r^/Z/nZ/h-
/nformari&ni &xd4>af unrnr ru/&£ t$ tt^cTud/di^/' "M/IC/IJ 
Z?tfcctN*> cb/iw/y Z, ZffX. 
ara.6/el<L &t first 4/0/o<t4f<$/)d<zIst pr&/Z/nZ/)4/y ji&yrmp 4nd 4rr4iin/n&/rf'$ in -re* tony tesek. 
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History: C. 1953, 78-5-112, enacted by L. Croaa-Referaices, — Selection of j ^ 
1989, ch. 157, f 21. Role 18, Rules of Criminal Procedure. ' 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 157, 
§ 51 makes the act effective on July 1,1989. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — Jury trial rights in, and on appeal 
from, small claims court proceeding, 70 
AXJUth 1119. 
78-5-113. Process to any part of the state — Service, 
(1) Process from a justice court may be issued to any place in the.state, 
(2) Subpoenas in any action or proceeding of a justice court may be issued to 
any place in the state. 
(3) All warrants issued by a justice court for violation of any state law or 
local ordinance within a court's jurisdiction are directed to the sheriff, any 
constable of the county, or to the marshal or city police of the town or city. 
History: C. 1953, 78-5-113, enacted by L. Abuse of process a misdemeanor, § 76-S-60L 
1989, ch. 157, S 22. Constables to serve process, § 17-25-1. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 157, Peace officers may serve process, i 10-748. 
§ 51 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. Sheriffs to serve process, § 17-22-2. 
Cross-References. — Process, Rule 4, Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Justices of Key Numbers. — Justices of the Peace *• 
the Peace § 58. 79. 
CJLS. — 51 CJJS. Justices of the Peace 
§ 67. 
78-5-114, 78-5-115. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 49 repeals rent criminal jurisdiction and jurisdiction of 
§§ 78-5-114 and 78-5-115. as enacted by Laws municipal and county courts, respectively, ef-
1989, ch. 157, §§ 23 and 24, relating to concur- fective January 1, 1992. 
78-5-116. Disposition of fines. 
(1) Except as otherwise specified by this section, fines and forfeitures col-
lected by a justice court shall be remitted, one-half to the treasurer of the local 
government responsible for the court and one-half to the treasurer of the local 
government which prosecutes or which would prosecute the violation. 
(2) (a) For vioi*i.^n of Title 23, the court shall allocate 85% to the Division 
of Wildlife Resources and 15% to the general fund of the city or county 
government responsible for the justice court. 
(b) For violation of Title 73, Chapter 18, the court shall allocate 85% to 
the Division of Parks and Recreation and 15% to the general fund of the 
city or county government responsible for the justice court 
(3) The surcharge established by Section 63-63a-l shall be paid to the state 
treasurer. 
138 
Ch. 48 CITIES, TOWNS AND SUBDIVISIONS [268] 
/ &# 
) 10-3-1205. Rights, powers, and duties of municipality operating under 
option form. 
Any municipality operating under this part shall retain and have the 
rights, powers, and duties now or hereafter granted to municipalities of the 
same class and those rights, powers and duties which could be granted to 
municipalities of the same class. 
K ^ 10-3-1206. Limitation on changing form of government. 
Following approval of an ^ optional form of municipal government by 
voters of a municipality, no other form of municipal government may be 
placed on the ballot in the municipality for a period of six years after the 
election at which the optional form was approved. 
10-3-1207. Disapproval of optional form by voters—Limitation on 
resubmission. 
If the voters of a municipality fail to approve an optional form of 
municipal government at a special election called for the purpose, the same 
optional form may not be placed on the ballot of that municipality for a 
period of at least two years following the date on which it was disapproved. 
10-3-1208. Election of officers—When new government operative— 
Compensation of officials without position in new government. 
Upon approval of an optional form of government by a municipality 
pursuant to this part, election of officers shall be held in the municipality on 
the Tuesday next following the first Monday in November following 
approval of the optional form, or on the same day in the year next following, 
whichever day falls in an odd-numbered year. The new government shall 
become effective at 12 o'clock noon on the first Monday of January following 
the election of officers. Elected officials of the municipality whose positions 
would no longer exist as a result of the adoption of a form of government 
provided for in this act shall be paid at the same rate until the date on which 
their terms would have expired, if they hold no municipal office in the new 
government for which they are regularly compensated. At their option, 
former commissioners of first and second class cities, council members of 
third class cities, or board members of towns may serve as one of the council 
members for the remainder of their term. 
10-3-1209. Council-mayor and council-manager form defined. 
The optional form of government known as the council-mayor form vests 
the government of a municipality which adopts this form in two separate, 
independent, and equal branches of municipal government; the executive 
branch consisting of a mayor and the administrative departments and 
officers; and the legislative branch consisting of a municipal council. The 
optional form known as the council-manager form vests the government of 
the municipality in a municipal council which shall be deemed the governing 
359 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 7 
the prosecuting attorney, any unexecuted warrant shall be returned to 
the magistrate for cancellation. 
(Amended by L. 1993, ch. 17, § 4, effective July 1, 1993.) 
Bench warrant, failure of one on bail to ap-
pear for judgment, Rule 22. 
Citation for misdemeanor, §§ 77-7-18 to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1993, rewrote the last 
sentence in Subdivision (b), adding Subdivi-
sions (1) and (2) and substituting 'the magis-
trate shall state on the warrant:" for "the 
amount of bail shall be fixed by the magistrate 
and stated on the warrant." 
Cross-References. — Arrest generally, 
§ 77-7-1 et seq. 
Bail, § 77-20-1 et seq. 
Bench warrant, failure of one on bail to ap-
pear at arraignment, Rule 10. 
77-7-20. 
Extradition, governor's warrant, § 77-30-7. 
Fees of constable serving warrant or sum-
mons, § 21-3-3.5. 
"Magistrate" defined, § 77-1-3. 
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to proceed-
ings for issuance of warrant for arrest or for 
issuance of criminal summons, U.R.E. 1101. 
Youth Parole Authority, revocation of pa-
role, order to retake violator, § 62A-7-112. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavits. 
Issuance of warrant. 
—Discretion of magistrate. 
Affidavits. 
Affidavits for arrest need not show a prima 
facie case; affidavits need only set forth facts 
tending to establish the commission of the of-
fense and the guilt of the defendant. United 
States v. Eldredge, 5 Utah 161, 13 P. 673 
(1887), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 636, 12 S. 
Ct. 980, 36 L. Ed. 857 (1892). 
Issuance of warrant. 
—Discretion of magistrate. 
A magistrate is not justified in refusing to 
issue a warrant unless the charge is too indefi-
nitely stated to warrant the belief that an of-
fense has been committed, or that defendant is 
the guilty party. United States v. Eldredge, 5 
Utah 161, 13 P. 673 (1887), appeal dismissed, 
145 U.S. 636, 12 S. Ct. 980, 36 L. Ed. 857 
(1892). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Bail §§ 23, 54; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 334 
et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Arrest *» 65 to 68; Bail «=» 
42, 49; Criminal Law •» 215 to 220. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 10 et 
seq.; 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and Recognizance 
§ 23. 
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Arrest §§ 4 to 9; 8 C.J.S. 
Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate. 
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant 
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons. 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without 
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magis-
trate for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be filed 
without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense. 
(c) (1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was 
committed the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be re-
turned to the county where the crime was committed and shall be taken 
before the proper magistrate under these rules. 
(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to 
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for 
which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under 
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the person arrested may state in writing a desire to 
forfeit bail, waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, 
and consent to disposition of the case in the county in which the person 
was arrested, is held, or is present. 
(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in 
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the pro-
ceeding or copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which 
the defendant is arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue 
in that county. 
(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the 
warrant. 
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(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misde-
meanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a 
conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken 
without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county of ar-
rest for the determination of bail under Section 77-20-1 and released on 
bail or held without bail under Section 77-20-1. 
(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the 
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate. 
(d) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon 
the defendant's first appearance, inform the defendant: 
(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy; 
(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the infor-
mation and how to obtain them; 
(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court 
without expense if unable to obtain counsel; 
(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and 
(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that 
the statements the defendant does make may be used against the defen-
dant in a court of law. 
(e) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph 
(d) and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and 
opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any 
attorney by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee. 
(f) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate 
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea. 
(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magis-
trate as provided by law. 
(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not 
be extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these 
rules and law applicable to criminal cases. 
(g) (1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant may not be 
called on to enter a plea before the committing magistrate. During the 
initial appearance before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised 
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the 
right to a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney con-
sents, the magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in 
the district court. 
(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the 
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination 
shall be held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the 
defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days 
if the defendant is not in custody. These time periods may be extended by 
the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not 
be held if the defendant is indicted. 
(h) (1) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws 
applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden 
of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the 
state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and 
present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe 
that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be 
bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause 
may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on 
the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly 
raised at the preliminary examination. 
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(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, 
the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defen-
dant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the 
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, 
(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either 
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses 
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is con-
cluded. On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators 
to be excluded from the courtroom. 
(j) (1) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district 
court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall 
transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records 
made of the proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, record-
ings, and any typewritten transcript. 
(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sher-
iff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order, 
(k) (1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material 
witness in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is re-
quired, the magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a 
sum considered adequate for the appearance of the witness. 
(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the 
court, the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness 
complies or is otherwise legally discharged. 
(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be 
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the 
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be 
discharged. 
(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent 
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be 
used at the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the wit-
ness. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; November 1, 1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1993, revised the subdi-
vision designations, substituting letters for 
numbers and vice versa and changing an inter-
nal reference accordingly, and deleted "under 
Section 77-7-19" from the end of the first sen-
tence in Subdivision (b). 
The 1996 amendment substituted "the near-
est available magistrate" for "a magistrate. If a 
magistrate is not available in the circuit or 
precinct, the person arrested shall be taken to 
the nearest available magistrate" in Subdivi-
sion (b), inserted "is" twice near the end of Sub-
division (c)(2), and made stylistic changes to 
make the text gender-neutral throughout. 
Cross-References. — Court reporters, 
§ 78-56-1.1 et seq. 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Appeals. 
Duties of magistrate. 
Preliminary hearing. 
—Binding accused over. 
Different offense. 
Failure to sign order. 
—Concurrent jurisdiction of circuit and district 
courts. 
Exclusion of witnesses and others, § 78-7-4. 
Juvenile committing felony, hearing and cer-
tification to district court, § 78-3a-25. 
Juvenile court, transfer of criminal proceed-
ing to, § 78-3a-18. 
Police lineup, right to have attorney present, 
§ 77-8-2. 
Preliminary examination may be waived, 
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 13. 
Rights of accused persons, Utah Const., Art. 
I, Sees. 7 to 12; § 77-1-6. 
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to proceed-
ings for bail, Rule 1101, U.R.E. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §5 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
—Evidence. 
—Nature of right. 
—Necessity. 
—Public access. 
—Right to counsel. 
Waiver. 
—Standard of proof. 
—Time. 
Delay for good cause. 
—Transcript. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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(v) presiding over meetings of the tax judges; and 
(vi) the use of law clerk resources to develop tax expertise, to assist the 
tax judges, and to facilitate consistency in the development of case prece-
dents in the tax area and otherwise assist in the transition as new tax 
judges are designated. 
(6) If a tax judge decides a taxation case of first impression, or one which 
creates new law or gives new guidance, the tax judge shall cause an opinion of 
the case to be published. An opinion need not be published where the case 
deals with settled rules of law. 
(7) Tax judges shall serve only so long as they are district court judges. Tax 
judges may, however, resign as tax judges, at their own request or the request 
of the Judicial Council, while still serving as district court judges. 
(8) If a tax judge does not have a full workload of taxation cases, the judge 
shall hear non-tax district court cases to maintain a full workload of cases. 
(Added effective April 1, 1997.) 
Cross-References. — Citation of opinion in rule, Rule 4-508, Rules of Judicial Administra-
case involving taxation published under this tion. 
ARTICLE 2. 
CIVIL. 
Rule 6-201. Distribution of trust funds. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for the distribution of funds deposited in a court 
trust account. 
Applicability: 
This rule applies to the District Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) When an order of distribution is presented to the District Court for 
payment of funds deposited with the court in an interest bearing account, as 
ordered by the court, the order shall include the social security number of the 
recipient if an individual or the federal tax identification number if a business 
entity. 
(2) Interest earned will be distributed based upon a percentage of the prin-
cipal amount allocated to each recipient named in the order. 
ARTICLE 3. 
CRIMINAL. 
Rule 6-301. Authority of court commissioner as magis-
trate. 
Intent: 
To provide for the authority of a court commissioner to act as a magistrate 
as required by § 77-1-3. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to court commissioners. 
Statement of the Rule: 
A court commissioner may exercise the following authority conferred upon 
magistrates by the Legislature: 
(1) issue warrants and summonses in traffic cases; and 
(2) set bail in traffic cases. 
(Added effective November 15, 1995.) 
Laws of Utah-1994 Ch.13 
CHAPTER 13 
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BOARD O F PARDONS 
AND PAROLE AMENDMENTS 
By Delpha A. Baird 
tf ACT RELATING TO THE CRIMINAL 
CODE; CORRECTING THE NAME TO THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE; AND 
MAKING OTHER TECHNICAL CORREC-
TIONS. 
'HIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
iMENDS: 
,3-5-210, AS RENUMBERED AND AMENDED 
BY CHAPTER 234, LAWS OF UTAH 
1993 
.3A-1-403.5, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 90. 
LAWS OF UTAH 1992 
12A-12-204.5, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 245, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1989 
13-2-103, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
280, LAWS OF UTAH 1992 
13-2-304, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 
228 AND 280, LAWS OF UTAH 1992 
13-25-2, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 238, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1992 
tf-55-277, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 137, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1990 
53-89-1, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 77, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1993 
>3-89-4, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 77, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1993 
>4-13-6, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 103, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1993 
>4-13-14.7, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 11. 
LAWS OF UTAH 1991 
>4-13-17, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
103, LAWS OF UTAH 1993 
>4-13-18. AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 211, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1985 
>4-13-20. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
206, LAWS OF UTAH 1991 
*-13-21, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 
103 AND 220, LAWS OF UTAH 1993 
^ 13-29, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
116, LAWS OF UTAH 1987 
*-13a-6. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
, 224, LAWS OF UTAH 1989 
)
 ~
22
~2, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 65 
AND 234. LAWS OF UTAH 1993 
"-'H201. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 17. 
LAWS OF UTAH 1993 
AST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
^ 125. LAWS OF UTAH 1989 
4 0 1 - AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
181. LAWS OF UTAH 1989 
AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 15. LAWS 
19S0 
AS ENACTED BY CHAFTER 171. 
^ 2 0 2 . AS 
?7-
•16-5 
rv , r W U T A H 
r?> 18-1 l-AWSOK UTAH 1992 AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS S2 
AND 220, LAWS OF UTAH 1993 
77-18-2 , AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 234, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1993 
77-18-4 , AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 15. LAWS 
OF UTAH 1980 
77_18-5, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 15, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1980 
77-19-7 , AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 15, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1980 
77-19-8 , AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 190, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1988 
77-19-13 . AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
190. LAWS OF UTAH 1988 
7 7 - 2 7 - 1 , AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 195, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1990 
jf 77-27-2 , AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 171, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1992 
77 -27 -5 , AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 38, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1993 
77-27-5 .5 , AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 140, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1992 
77-27-6 , AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 124, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1993 
77-27-7 , AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 195. 
LAWS OF UTAH 1990 
77-27-8 , AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 213, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1985 
77_27-9, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 142, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1992 
77-27-9.5 , AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 172, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1988 
77-27-9.7 , AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 11, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1991 
77-27-10, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 
35 AND 220, LAWS OF UTAH 1993 
77-27-21.5 , .AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
280, LAWS OF UTAH 1992 
77-28-4 , AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 15. LAWS 
OF UTAH 1980 
77-28a-4 , AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 38, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1982 
7 8 - 2 a - 3 . AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 127 
LAWS OF UTAH 1992 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
S e c t i o n 1. S e c t i o n A m e n d e d . 
Section 53-5-210 . Utah Code Annotated 1953. as 
renumbered and amended by Chapter 234. Laws of 
Utah 1993. is amended to read: 
53-5-210 . P e n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d state 
! h o s p i t a l to s u p p l y i n f o r m a t i o n . 
J i 1) The warden of the state prison, keeper of any 
jail or correctional institution, and superintendent 
of the s tate hospital shall forward to the division 
ia) the fingerprints and recent photographs of all 
persons confined in each institution under criminal 
commitment: 
tb i information relating to the parole, termination 
or expiration of sentence, or any other release oi 
each person from confinement during the preceding 
month: and 
•(•' a photograph taken near the time of release. 
••'2] The adult probation and parole section of th< 
Department of Corrections shall furnish to the divi-
MOII: 
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History: C. 1953, 77-27-4, enacted by L. former Subsection (2), which read "Any two 
)85, ch. 198, § 8; 1989, ch. 112, § 1; 1990, members constitute a quorum"; redesignated 
I. 195, § 3. former Subsection (3) as Subsection (2) and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- substituted "chairperson" for "board of par-
ent, effective April 23,1990, rewrote Subsec- dons" and for "chairman" in two places therein; 
on (1), which read "One member of the board
 an<^ deleted former Subsection (4) relating to 
tall be designated by the governor as chair- appointment of a chief executive officer, 
an for a term the governor specifies"; deleted 
7-27-5- Board of Pardons authority. 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons shall determine by majority decision when and 
under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state, 
persons committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at 
penal or correctional facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or im-
peachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released upon parole, 
pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitu-
tion remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The 
chairperson shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and 
in accordance with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings 
involving commutation and pardons. The chairperson may participate on 
any panel and when doing so is chairperson of the panel. The chairperson 
of the board may designate the chairperson for any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution 
remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence termi-
nated, except after a full hearing before the board or the board's ap-
pointed examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection 
other than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of 
the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing 
before the board. 
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole 
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the hear-
ing shall be given to the defendant, the county attorney's office responsi-
ble for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law enforcement 
officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and when-
ever possible, the victim or the victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include 
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by 
the board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms 
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving paroles, pardons, 
ommutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or 
)rfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this 
ection prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the 
overnor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for 
flenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. How-
ver, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the 
ioard of Pardons and the board, at that session, shall continue or terminate 
tie respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or pardon the 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 67A C J.S. Pardon and Parole § 44. 
Key Numbers. — Pardon and Parole *» 5. 
77-27-8. Record of hearing. 
(1) A verbatim record of proceedings before the Board of Pardons shall be 
maintained by a certified shorthand reporter or suitable electronic recording 
device, except when the board dispenses with a record in a particular hearing 
or a portion of the proceedings. 
(2) When the hearing involves the commutation of a death sentence, a 
certified shorthand reporter, in addition to mechanical means, shall record all 
proceedings except when the board dispenses with a record for the purpose of 
deliberations in executive session. The compensation of the reporter shall be 
determined by the board. The reporter shall immediately file with the board 
the original record and when requested shall with reasonable diligence fur-
nish a transcription or copy of the record upon payment of reasonable fees as 
determined by the board. 
(3) When the party in interest affirms by affidavit that he is unable to pay 
for a transcript or copy of the record which is necessary for further proceed-
ings available to him, and that affidavit is not refuted, the board may order 
the reporter to furnish to the party in interest a transcript, or a copy of the 
record, or so much of it as is reasonably applicable to any farther proceedings, 
or a copy of the recording, at the expense of the state, to the party in interest. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-8, enacted by L. ch. 213, § 4 repealed former § 77-27-8 (L. 
1985, ch. 213, § 4. 1980, ch. 15, § 2), relating to subpoena power, 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985, etc., of board, and enacted present § 77-27-8. 
77-27-9. Parole proceedings. 
(1) The Board of Pardons may pardon or parole any offender or commute or 
terminate the sentence of any offender committed to a penal or correctional 
facility which is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections for a 
felony or class A misdemeanor except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2). 
The release of an offender shall be at the initiative of the board, which shall 
consider each case as the offender becomes eligible. However, a prisoner may 
submit his own application, subject to the rules of the board. 
(2) (a) A person sentenced to prison for a felony of the first degree involving 
child kidnapping, a violation of Section 76-5-301.1; rape of a child, a 
violation of Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a child, a violation of Section 
76-5-402.3; sodomy upon a child, a violation of Section 76-5-403.1; aggra-
vated sexual abuse of a child, a violation of Subsection 76-5-404.1(3); or 
aggravated sexual assault, a violation of Section 76-5-405, or for a prior 
offense as described in Section 76-3-407, is not eligible for release on 
parole by the Board of Pardons until the offender has fully completed 
serving the minimum mandatory sentence imposed by the court. This 
subsection supersedes any other provision of law. 
(b) The board may not parole any offender or commute or terminate the 
sentence of any offender before the offender has served the minimum 
term for the offense, where: 
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(i) the offender was convicted of forcible sexual abuse, forcible sod-
omy, rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, 
or aggravated sexual assault as defined in Chapter 5, Title 76, and 
(ii) the victim of the offense was under 18 years of age at the time 
the offense was committed. 
(3) The board may issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses 
and the production of evidence, to administer oaths, and to take testimony for 
the purpose of any investigation by the board or any of its members or by a 
designated hearing examiner in the performance of its duties. A person who 
willfully disobeys a properly served subpoena issued by the board is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. 
(4) (a) The board may adopt rules consistent with law for its government, 
&4fj) meetings and hearings, the conduct of proceedings before it, the parole 
^/*jfc£nd pardon of offenders, the commutation and termination of sentences, 
and the general conditions under which parole may be granted and re-
£QM yoked. 
^ o (b) The rules shall ensure an adequate opportunity for victims to par-
ticipate at hearings held under this chapter, as provided in Section 
77-27-9.5. 
(c) The rules may allow the board to establish reasonable and equitable 
time limits on the presentations by all participants in hearings held un-
der this chapter. 
(5) The board does not provide counseling or therapy for victims as a part of 
their participation in any hearing under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-9, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 213, § 5; 1986, ch. 22, § 5; 1986, ch. 
41, § 3; 1988, ch. 172, § 3. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985, 
ch. 213, § 5 repealed former § 77-27-9 (L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 1, § 6), relating to 
appointment of reporter or recorder, and en-
acted present § 77-27-9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment by Chapter 22 in Subsection (1), first sen-
tence, substituted the language beginning "of-
fender committed to" and ending "class A mis-
demeanor" for "offender imprisoned in a state 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Good conduct deduction from sentence. 
Constitutionality. 
The minimum mandatory sentencing 
scheme set forth in Subsections 76-3-201(5), 
76-3-406(1), 76-5-404.1(4), and 77-27-9(2) is not 
unconstitutionally vague. State v. Gerrish, 746 
P.2d 762 (Utah 1987). 
The Utah parole statutes do not create a lib-
erty interest recognizable under the federal 
constitution. Houtz v. DeLand, 718 F. Supp. 
1497 (D. Utah 1989). 
prison or county jail for a felony or class A 
misdemeanor," and in Subsection (3) deleted a 
comma following law." 
The 1986 amendment by Chapter 41 substi-
tuted "aggravated sexual abuse of a child" for 
"sexual abuse of a child" in Subsection (2)(a). 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, deleted '"Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law" at the beginning of Subsection 
(2)(a) and added the second sentence thereof; 
redesignated former Subsections (4) and (3) as 
present Subsections (3) and (4)(a), respectively; 
and added Subsections (4)(b), (4)(c), and (5). 
Good conduct deduction from sentence. 
Under former statute allowing good conduct 
deductions from sentences, there was no reduc-
tion provided where the term of imprisonment 
was less than three months. Ex parte Nokes, 6 
Utah 106, 21 P. 458 (1889). 
State Board of Pardons had jurisdiction and 
authority to fix and determine time to be 
served by one sentenced under former indeter-
minate sentence law at any period equal to or 
less than maximum penalty provided by law, 
and it was not mandatory that it apply "good 
conduct time" allowance provided in former 
statute. Cardisco v. Davis, 91 Utah 323, 64 
P.2d 216 (1937). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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PARDONS AND PAROLES 77-27-11 
77-27-10. Conditions of parole. 
(1) When the Board of Pardons releases an offender on parole, it shall issue 
to the parolee a certificate setting forth the conditions of parole which he shall 
accept and agree to as evidenced by his signature affixed to the agreement. A 
copy of the agreement shall be delivered to the Department of Corrections and 
a copy shall be given to the parolee. The original shall remain with the board's 
file. 
(2) If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to violate Section 
76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(1), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 
76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405 is released 
on parole, the board shall order outpatient mental health counseling and 
t reatment as a condition of parole. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-10, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
1985, ch. 213, § 6; 1986, ch. 22, § 6. ment, in Subsection (1), in the second sentence 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985, deleted "certified" preceding "copy of the 
ch. 213, § 6 repealed former § 77-27-1C (L agreement" and in the third sentence, substi-
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1983, ch. 88, § 37; 1985, ch.
 tuted "board's" for "board." 
212, § 22). relating to cooperation of institu- CrossReferences . — Indeterminate sen-
tions and procedure where indeterminate sen- tence § 77-18-4. 
tenee imposed, and enacted present § 77-27-10. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Propriety, in criminal case, of fed- Key Numbers. — Pardon and Parole «=» 5. 
eral district court order restricting defendants 
right to re-enter or stay in United States, 94 
A.L.R. Fed 619. 
77-27-11. Revocation of parole. 
(1^ The board may revoke the parole of any person who is found to have 
violated any condition of his parole. 
(21 If a parolee is detained by the Department of Corrections or any law 
enforcement official for a suspected violation of parole, the Department of 
Corrections shall immediately report the alleged violation to the board, by 
means of an incident report, and make any recommendation regarding the 
incident. No parolee may be held for a period longer than 72 hours, excluding 
weekends and holidays, without first obtaining a warrant. 
(3) Any member of the board may issue a warrant based upon a certified 
warrant request to a peace officer or other persons authorized to arrest, de-
tain, and return to actual custody a parolee, and may upon arrest or otherwise 
direct the Department of Corrections to determine if there is probable cause to 
believe that the parolee has violated the conditions of his parole. 
(4) Upon a finding of probable cause, a parolee may be further detained or 
imprisoned again pending a hearing by the board or its appointed examiner. 
(5' The board or its appointed examiner shall conduct a hearing on the 
alleged violation, and the parolee shall have written notice of the time and 
place of the hearing, the alleged violation of parole, and a statement of the 
evidence against him. The board or its appointed examiner shall provide the 
parolee the opportunity to be present, be represented by counsel, to be heard, 
to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses, absent a showing of good cause for not allowing 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND TOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OP UTAH, * MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, * CASE NO. 931901914 
VS. * 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, * 
Defendant. • 
The Court has before it a Motion for Counsel and Motion to 
Correct Illegal Sentence and Arrest Judgment, filed by the 
defendant in this matter. The precise basis of the defendant's 
Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is difficult to discern. It 
appears that the defendant is contesting the legality of his 
sentence because Third District Court Commissioner Frances M. 
Palacios, acting as magistrate, did not have the authority to sign 
the Information in this case. 
The defendant made a similar argument in State v. Thomas. 961 
P.2d 299 (Utah 1998). In that case, the defendant alleged that 
Commissioner Palacios did not have the authority to issue a search 
warrant. The Utah Supreme Court agreed that since a search warrant 
is essentially an order, the issuance of a search warrant is a core 
judicial function which, under Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1994), commissioners lack the authority to perform. In its 
STATE V. THOMAS PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
ruling, the court explained that "functions that commissioners can 
constitutionally perform are those that constitute recommendations 
or other functions that are reviewable by a judge." Id. at 301. 
The court stated that since a search warrant was not subject to 
review by a judge "with the possibility of disallowing the search," 
the issuance of a search warrant is a core judicial function. Id. 
It appears that the defendant is again relying on Ohms to 
argue that signing an information is a core judicial function which 
Commissioner Palacios lacked the authority to perform. This Court 
disagrees that an information can be characterized as a core 
judicial function. Specifically, an information differs from a 
search warrant because it does not command any action, but rather 
fulfills the requirement of informing a defendant of the charges 
against him so that a defense can be initiated. 
Moreover, unlike a search warrant, an information is 
"reviewable" in the sense that a judge (Circuit Court Judge Philip 
K. Palmer in this case) determines whether the State has presented 
the necessary quantum of evidence to bind the matter over for 
trial. Therefore, since Commissioner Palacios1 signature on the 
Information merely served as a recommendation which was subject to 
review by the judge assigned to determine whether bindover is 
appropriate, this Court concludes that it is not a core judicial 
STATE V. THOMAS PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
function. Accordingly, this Court denies the defendant's pending 
Motions. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the 
Court, denying the defendant's Motions. 
Dated this jT)dav of April, 2001. 
PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
B£Sj£Bi£T-Jcaini£ 
STAMP Uf~ """ 
STATE V. THOMAS PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this day of April, 
2001: 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
160 East 300 South, sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Richard Dee Thomas #13260 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
ADDENDUM D 
I»«TRICK / V N D E K B O H ( # 4 7 8 7 ) 
Attorney for Defendant: 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
Defendant 
FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE 
RULES OF CRIMINAL/PROCEDURE 
Case No. 931008943FS 
CAO 93-1-89395 
COMM. PEUI 
COMES NOW the defendant, RICHARD DEE THOMAS, through 
his/her attorney, PATRICK ANDERSON, and requests the following 
material be provided to him/her as discovery no later than three 
days prior to the calendar call presently set for July 13, 1993. 
To-wit: 
1. All police reports and investigations concerning the 
above-entitled case; 
2. All written or recorded statements of the defendant and 
co-defendant(s), if any; 
3. The criminal record of the defendant and the criminal 
record including any convictions of any witnesses to be called by 
the prosecution; 
4. All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the 
defendant; 
6. All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; 
7. All physical evidence taken and all investigative 
analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case. 
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-26(5) (b) , the State 
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following 
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. 
DATEQ^this jjj day of July, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
4*t 
PATRICK ANDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Appearance of 
Counsel to the County Attorney Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111 this day of July, 1993. 
DAVID E. YOCOM |- *. '. P V) 
Salt Lake County Attorney \" » '— '— ^ 
ROBERT L. STOTT, Bar No. 3131
 r. cm Q OH 
Deputy County Attorney ' 93 JUL IS hl' 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300__ , ,.U;T cO'J*7 
Salt Lake City, Utah 840i£l^  ^  J*.""^ T^o\vIS104* 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 SALT U — 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE o/UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY 
-vs- ) 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, ) Case No. 931008943FS 
Defendant. 
Your general request for discovery cannot be honored 
pursuant to State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah, 1987). Please 
find enclosed copies of pertinent documents reflecting only what 
is contained in the prosecution file. Other documents may or may 
not exist in individual police agency files and you are directed 
to contact these agencies for such information. 
The Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney will strictly comply 
with the mandates of Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 1993. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
n 
ROfiERT L. STOTT ^ k 
Denutv Countv Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Response to Request for Discovery was delivered to 
Patrick Anderson, Attorney for Defendant Richard Dee Thomas at 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 
/^Ll^day of July, 1993. 
/ 
^3%. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL CODE 
HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
is not a commissioned notary public of the State of Utah and for whom a notary 
surety bond is not on file in this office, 
AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION: 
S*2E§ 
Paled this ^/0 ZZ 
1(UJ 
-n>&ZT. 
- ^ LyO^zZj^--
gbmut&tartfoe Office of tf>e Courts! 
Chief Justioe Michael D. Zimmn in<ii i 
3iair Utah Judicial Council 
July 5, 1995 
Judge Pamela T. Greenwood 
Interim State Court Administrator 
Myron K. March 
Deputy Court Administrator 
Richard Dee Thomas 
P.O. Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
Dear Mr. Thomas: 
Your most recent records request has been forwarded to me 
for response • You have apparently requested an oath that is to 
be filed under §10-3-828. The section that you have referenced 
refers to persons who are officers and administrators of 
municipalities. Commissioner Palacios is not an officer or an 
administrator of a municipality. Therefore, Commissioner 
Palacios has not filed any documents under those sections and is 
not required to file any documents under those sections. We 
cannot grant your records request. 
Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions 
Sincerely, 
A 
Brent Jonnson 
Acting General Counsel 
. . . The court must also note that the circumstances of 
this case do not readily suggest a waiver. This defendant was 
arrested at gun point and taken to the police station. There, he 
was confronted by a veritable array of officers from several 
different law enforcement agencies, accompanied by the United 
States Attorney. Despite his requests to be allowed to call his 
attorney, he was not permitted to do so until his arraignment the 
following day. Under the circumstances, any withdrawal of the 
defendant's original insistence that his attorney be present 
should not be lightly inferred. 
Mr. Thomas should have been afforded an opportunity to use 
the telephone and consult with his attorney. Instead, his will 
was broken and he was coerced into making incriminating 
statements. 
No system worth p rese rv ing should have t o fear t h a t i f an accused 
i s pe rmi t t ed t o consu l t wi th a lawyer, he w i l l become aware of, 
and e x e r c i s e , these r i g h t s . If the e x e r c i s e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r i g h t s w i l l thwart the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a system of law 
enforcement, then t h e r e i s something very wrong wi th t h a t system. 
Escobedo v . I l l i n o i s , 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964). 
The Po l i ce misconduct i n t h i s c a se , and t h e con t inu ing t a i n t 
of t h a t misconduct in compell ing Mr. Thomas t o make i n c r i m i n a t i n g 
s t a t emen t s , r e q u i r e s t h a t Mr. Thomas's s t a t emen t s be suppressed. 4 6 
VII 
THE PHOTO ARRAY THE POLICE USED WAS OVERLY SUGGESTIVE 
Although motions to suppress the photo array were denied. 
[Findings of facts, R. 526-552], at the trial it became clear that 
the witness' identification was the result of the overly 
suggestive photo array. Under cross-examination the Prosecution's 
star witness, Mr. Kimball, admitted that the way the photo array 
46The Police made no recording, electronic or written of the alleged 
confession. [R. 854-1026][Tr. pp 314-19]. 
abmtniStratibe Office of tftt Courts 
... vtu 1UM_-I L). Zimmerman Chicl Justice MICIUM-1 v> *-• 
Chair Utah Judicial Council 
May 1, 1996 
Daniel J. Becker 
State Court Administrator 
Myron K. March 
Deputy Court Administrator 
Richard Dee Thomas 
SMO Dogwood F-2 
P.O. Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
Dear Mr. Thomas: 
Enclosed please find a requests that is being returned to 
you. Judge Phillip K. Palmer is not a justice court judge and 
therefore we do not have any documentation on that issue. 
Justice court judges are employed by cities and counties. Judge 
Palmer is a Circuit Court judge. 
As to the request for completion of C.J.A. requirements and 
certification of judge, you'll have to be more specific for me to 
determine whether such a record exists. Also, any such record 
would involve Judge Palmer. You would not be the subject of the 
record and payment for copying will be necessary. 
Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. 
Sincerely, 
Brent Jdhnson 
General Counsel 
enc. 
DEFENDANT: RICHARD DEE THOMAS 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
RELEASE STATUS: PRISON 
ss 
* * . . . . 
DEC 1 7 '£33 
SALTLAKECCir.'TX 
By 
<& QcJ^iCRlM 
I, Philip K. Palmer, Judge of the Circuit Court of the State of Utah, do order that the 
defendant be bound over to answer the within charge(s) in the Third District Court in and for 
Salt T^ frft County, State of Utah. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and 
complete copy of all proceedings, and that the papers hereto are all the papers filed with the 
Court in said case. 
IN WITNESS WHERE OF, I have 
hereunto set my hand this 16th day 
of December. 1993 
CmCUIXXOURTJI3DGE \ 
, — . / . » : > • * . . . . * • . • « - > • • * * • v - - * — 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff. 
- * W W 
vs. 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) ..._ 
Case No. ^ 3 K l O t ^ > H 
Count No. 
Honorable u n l l i ' * » * t 6 &r:lHik)* 
Clerk m tZchL^s 
Reporter K "SClv^l^i^ 
Bailiff £> Cit-o^iA^ 
Date fc^ 7. ><1?f7 T 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by ) ^a jury; D the court; Q plea of guilty; 
O plea of no contest; of the offense of Q&6 (Zo&t&yZ'Y
 : ] , a felony 
of the _ L _ degree, a a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
is now adjudged guilty represented by Ail for)} iZ/ndrWfifrfc* state being represented by RA^^htL 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
years and which may be for life; D to a maximum mandatory term of 
D not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
"BT of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $- to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
R such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, Q Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
D 
t( ) are hereby dismissed. 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
(2 Commitment shall issue ^trctLu)^L^ 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: Uuu^ \^>\ ^ M L I ^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Defense Counsel 
HAnnh/ P/Mintw Attr%mt*\/ Page 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ROBERT L. STOTT, Bar No. 3131 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
Qoimr) 
7-/3 - 93 
1&-Z-Z/ 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
/d:ot 
/ . & ' < 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v s -
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
DOB 3/9/54 
OTN 705452 
Defendant. 
Screened by: R. STOTT 
Assigned to: R. STOTT 
BAIL: $100,000.00 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 
93100^3 FS 
The undersigned R. Dal ling - Salt Lake City Police 
Department, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant, committed the crime of: 
COUNT I 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 132 North Redwood 
Road, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about June 
30, 1993 through July 1, 1993,, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, RICHARD DEE THOMAS, a party 
to the ojLfense, unlawfully and intentionallyt took personal 
property in the possession of "TenBucJcy "Fried Chicken from 
the person or immediate presence of Robert Kimball, and in 
the course of committing _said,.,jobbery used or threatened the 
use of a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a f irearif and/or ^ auSeg 
serious bodily injury to Robert Kimbal^ further, that a 
firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the representation of 
a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Robbery, giving rise to enhanced penalties as 
provied by $76-3-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
INFORMATION 
STATE OF UTAH V. RICHARD DEE THOMAS 
County Attorney No. 93 1 89395 
Page 2 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
R. Jones, Rose Jones, Fred Louis, George Vaughn, Don Bell, 
Roc*. Hunt, Scott Williams, Ray Dalling, H. Jackson, Robert 
Kin:ball, Curtis Stevens, Jinny Morton, Christina Najera, 
Bree Lopez, Wade Campbell, Mindi Gleed, Chad Brown, Julie 
Jaeger and Marilyn Walters. 
PROBABLE PATIST? CTA^raraT. 
Defendant has admitted to affiant to be the person who on 
the above date and place used a gun to rob the Kentucky Fried 
Chicken store. 
R. DALLING 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before 
ne this C\ day of July, 
1993. 
4 v 
Authorized for presentment and filing^ : 
DAVTD E. YOCOM, County Attorney 
R ^ t t S M. PALACIOS 
A e^rt~r Deputy County Attorney 
July 6, 1993 
msy/93 1 89395 
OTN 705452 
CAO /93 1 89395 
THIRD CIRCUIT COU¥T, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUMTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, * 
* Before: ____t 
Plaintiff, * Magistrate 
* 
vs. #-. 
* WARRANT OF ARREST 
RICHARD DEE. THOMAS, * 
DOB 03/09/54 * 
OTN 705452' * Case No. 
* 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH; 
To any Peace Officer in the State of Utah, Greetings: 
* 931O0&W3 ps 
An Information, upon oath, having been this day made before 
me by R. Dalling - Salt Lake City Police Department, Agency Case 
No, 93-83606, and it appears from the Information or Affidavit 
filed with the Information, that there is probable cause to 
believe that the public offense of; 
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, has been 
committed, and that RICHARD DEE THOMAS has committed 
it, 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to arrest the above-named 
defendant forthwith and bring the defendant before this Court, or 
before the nearest or most accessible magistrate for setting 
baile If the defendant has fled justice, you shall pursue the 
defendant into any other county of this state and there arrest 
the defendant. The Court finds reasonable grounds to believe 
defendant will not appear upon a summons. 
Bail is set in the amount of $100,000.00* 
Dated this ^ 2 day of July, A.D. 1993. 
Th^ s-^  Warrant may be served day or 
^ \ j ; 
MAGISTRATE v z 
\ \$0££j I FRANCES M. PALAC10S 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ROBERT L. STOTT. Bar No. 3131 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South. Suite 300 
Sail Lake City, Utah 84 111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RJCHARD DEE THOMAS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 931901914FS 
Hon. John A. Rokich 
The matter coming before the court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information, the 
court having read the motion and the State's Answer and Affidavit; and the court having perused 
the file and docket entries, hereby ORDERS that the defendant's Motion To Suppress 
Information is denied. 
As to the speedy trial issue, the reasons for the delay in the case going to trial can be 
attributed to the defendant. Addition.ilh. the defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice 
caused b> the delay. 
As to the 120 day demand for disposition, the file and docket demonstrated that the 
dclcndnnt himself caused the delay bevond the 120 days and that the disposition date has been 
properly extended because of his changing of attorneys, his motions, and his requested 
continuances. 
ORDER 
Case No. 931901914FS 
Page 2 
DATED this 27th day of December, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN A. ROK1CH, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I Iiereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was delivered to Mary 
C Corporon. Attorney for Defendant Richard Dee Thomas, at 310 South Main Street, Suite 
14U0. Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on the day of December, 1994. 
MEMBERS 
UJIW.BOYDEN W^ZZ/PASJ PAULW.SHEFFIELO 
ORIAJ.PALACIOS \ | ? S C ^ > y Admioittntor 
«Y L WEBSTER ^iliV' 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER OF PAROLE 
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 99913260 
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. 13260 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THOMAS. RICHARD DEE 
This matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or 
expiration of sentence having come before the Utah State Board of Pardons 
in a#regularly scheduled hearing on the 21st day of July, 1989, and the 
applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to 
appearance and the Board having heard the case, issues the following order: 
It is hereby ordered that THOMAS, RICHARD DEE be paroled from the 
punishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon him/her by a judge of the 
Second District Court, Third Circuit Court, Third District C In and for the 
County of Davis, Salt Lake for the crime(s) of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, 1st degree 
felony. Expiration LIFE: AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, 1st degree felony. Expiration 
LIFE; ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY, 3rd degree felony, Expiration; DISTRIBUTING DRUGS 
FOR VALUE, 3rd degree felony, Expiration 11/21/93. 
The parole shall not become effective until 26th dyr of May. 1992. 
The applicant agrees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by 
signing the parole agreement. The parole agreement or contract shall be 
administered by duly authorized agents of tne Utah State Department of 
Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant 
shall be guilty of any infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah 
State Prison or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah 
State Prison or is found to be in violation of any other law of the State of 
Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this Order of Parole is 
revoked and becomes null and void. 
Dated this 21st day of July, 1989. 
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this 
11th day of August, 1989, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and 
hereby affix my signature as Administrator for and on behalf of the State of 
Utah, Board of Pardons. 
MEMBERS 
VLW.BOY0&4 K&HE3PJ& WUtW.SHCFFiaD 
OftA J. PALABOS W ^ 3 > y Administrator 
W L WEBSTER ><1!>^ 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAROUE AGREEMENT 
ihard D. Thomas, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Utah State 
tment of Corrections and be accountable for my actions and conduct to Utah State 
ctions, according to this Agreement* 
ther agree to abide by all conditions of parole as set forth in this Agreement and any 
ional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons, consistent with the 
of the State of Utah. I fully understand that the violation of this Agreement and/or any 
tious thereof or any new conviction for a crime may result in action by the Board causing 
role to be revoked or my parole period to start over. 
CONDITIONS OF PARO£ 
ELEASE: On the day of my release from the institution or confinement. I will 
report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in writing. 
ESIDENCE: I shall establish a residence of record and shall reside at such residence 
in fact and on record and shall not change my place of residence without 
tabwledge of my Parole Agent: and I shall not leave the State of Utah 
without prior written authorization from my garole Agent. It is hereby 
acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written 
authorization from my Parole Agent that I hereby waive extradition, from any 
state in which I may be found, to the State of Utah. 
XJNDUCT: I shall obey all State and Federal laws and municipal ordinances at all 
times. 
SEPORT: I shall make written or in person reports to my Parole Agent by the fifth 
of each and every month or as directed and I snail permit visits to my place 
of residence as required by my Parole Agent for the purpose of insuring 
compliance with the conditions of parole. 
EMPIJGKMENT: I will seek and maintain full-time employment unless I am participating in 
an educational or therapy program approved by my Parole Agent. 
SEARCH: 
compliance with the conditions of my paroIeT 
WEAPONS: I shall not own, possess, or have under my control,orminmy custody any 
ASSOCIATION: I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can 
reasonably te expected to result in, or which has resulted in criminal or 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: I shall: 
1. Submit to Random Urinalysis. 
2. Successfully complete ISP program. 
3. Successfully complete Substance Abuse Therapy. 
ive read, understand and agree to the above conditions and I hereby acknowledge receipt of 
spy of this Agreement. 
MESSED BY: this day of , 19 
LE: SIGNED: 
Parolee 
AMSESS: 
inistrator, Board of Bardons 
AMENDED 7/26/1988 
V ••. .•  >y 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF WARRANT FOR ARREST 
o d • 4 4 i Richard THOMAS # _ _ _ _ _ 
DSP #13260 
PZ0 3~7-5« 
THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
To any Peaee Officer, State of Utah, Greetings: 
A certified Warrant Request having been made before the Board by Arthur Street 
and it appears from the Warrant Request or Affidavit filed with the Warrant Request that there is 
reason to believe that the parole violation(s) of 
1) Curfev Violation; 2) Failure to Maintain Baployaent; 3) Failure to Reside 
at Residence of Record 
has/have been committed, and that the person named above has committed it/them; and 
Whereas the person named above was conditionally released by the Board of Pardons of 
the Stale of Utah upon parole on the 1 3 t h day of A P r 1 1 . I9?£ ; 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to arrest the above-named parolee and to 
cause him or her to be detained and returned to actual custody pending a determination whether 
there is probably cause to believe that the parolee has violated the conditions of his or her parole. 
Dated this 1 8 t h day of ^ , 19 9 3 . 
Member. Utah! wile Board of Pardons 
A n o 'M r> 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JoiiLJdntion of tiis Status of t ^ ^ ^ ^ . A ^ i ^ L 1 ^ PRISON AO. ±±-yA 
i\ii .ivjv.ri.i^uie! meter c xiAc 0:1 :J; CJ isi Jo rat •; oa ;vefo::e tae Jean 5tite Joi-:d 
of Parlous on the 2Jrd lay of September, 1997, for: 
SPECIAL Axi&liiOli REVIEW 
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board 
makes the following decision and order: 
RESULTS 
Revoke 0 4 / 1 J / 1 9 9 3 p a r o l e . . Schedule 
f o r an P a r o l e V i o l a t i o n / O r i g i n a l Hearing i;i 
0 V 1 9 9 8 . 
1° l 1 l l T i „ - 3°.nt J i 3 e .1). 
1 AGGRAVATEJ LlOBiiZrtY J -L .I-JJ40 
: AGGRAVATED fCID^APPlI. J - L , . - J . U J 
J ESCAPE Fio.i CUSTODY o».> : R - G J ~ ^ cs 
> AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 3-L 9J19J19U 
Taio iicLs'.oa i.-:. suoject to re viev ini moiif Lcat i ->a by tie board of Pardons at 
any Liine until actual release from custody, 
B:/ order of tae Board of Pardons of tne State of Utah, 1 aave tais date 
23rd day of September, 1997, affixed my signature as Chairman for and 
on behalf of tiie State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
J_udgo_ 
"PALLER" 
D s 
.uiirt. v A 
iLIJG BO 
expiration 
LIFE 
LIFE 
LIFE 
LIFE 
In the District Court of Davis County JJ 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
State of Utah j,/3&0 
Plaintiff 
„, Defendant J 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
AND COMMITMENT TO THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
#2-3340 
That whereas, said defendants RICHARD DEE THOMAS 
N l M 
having heretofore on the 1 6 t h day of June . , A. D. 19-SJL. 
P l e a d ttnilfcy in this court „ £ ? . the 
Ptea4 Guilty or Ha*n« B m Convicted By • Jury . To Of 
charge of Aggravated Rohhpry-and cZlL2_^l C J& 
fo fhp nhargp nf Aggravated Kidnapping.. ^Jl2£^t. a felony 
Name of Crime 
and now being present in court, accompanied by his attorney, and rcn<\y for sontence, thereupon the 
court renders its judgment as follows: 
You, RICHARD DEE THOMAS _. _. 
having 
J ? l ^ ^ _ G u i l t y
 % the court adjudges you to 
Plead Guilty or flavin* Been Convicted lly a Jury 
be guilty and it is the judgment of the court and the scntoiu e of the law that y« »u 
&T£HAJ^DEE.. THOMAS _ 
for your said offense do be confined in the Utah State Prison for the term of 
-5 y e a r s - t o . i i f e . . £ o r . A g g r a v a t e d RobberJ*.and 5 y e a r s to. l i fe_JLoJC 
A g g r a v a t e d Kidnapping *+-**** sentence 
rr IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the said 
-RICHARD .DEE THOMAS--
_ . be sentenced to imprisonment 
Nam* ill r^ 
in the Utah State Prison for a tenn of 15)Five y e a r a. t o X i f e on AggravatedJfcbtery_ t 
and (5) F i v e y e a r s t o L i f e on A g g r a v a t e d Kidnapping t o run c o n s e c -
u t i v e l y .
 miC , n o n 
said sentence to begin as of J u n e Z5, 1980
 # j9 
NOW, THEREFORE, you . RICHARD JDEJI. THO.MAS . 
Name of Prisoner 7* 
above named defendant—, are remanded into the custody of Uie Sheriff of Davis County, State of 
Utah, to be by him delivered into the custody of the Warden, or other proper officer of said Utah 
State Prison in execution of this judgment and sentence. 
WITNESS: Honorable J . DUFFY PALMER ^ 
Judge, and the seal of the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the State of 
Utah affixed this . 2 6 t l l _ _ day of J.un£_. _ _ . , A. D. 19.8.0... 
1 U U
 ^ Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
n i f)/l Judicial District in and for Davis County, 
L'l u J* State of Utah. 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF ORDER OF PAROLE 
ETPKARn THOMAS UTAH STATE PRISON NO. 13260 
PAROLE 
matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or expiration of sentence having come before the 
\ State Board of Pardons in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 2 0 t h day of Aug. 19J3LD, and the 
icant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to appearance and the Board having heard the 
, issues the following order: 
herby ordered that R i c h a r d Thomas be paroled from the punishment and sentence 
tofore imposed upon him by a judge of the 2nd , 3rd Judical District Court in and for the County of Davis, Weber 
the crime of r.ranH T.m-rony M-10 y e a r s ) Thef t - , -3rd riegree-..(-Q>-5-gg*E*^ 
and Aggravated Robbery (5 yea r s - LIFE) and Aggravated Kidnapping (5 y e a r s 
- LIFE) C o n s e c u t i v e l y _T 
Darole shall not become effective until the 11 t h day o f _ A i i g j i & £ 19 JLZ. 
applicant agrees to the following conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by signing the certificate. The 
le agreement or contract shall be administered by the duly authorized agent of the Utah State Adult Probation 
Parole Department in and for the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant shall be guilty of any infractions of the rules 
regulations of the Utah State Prison or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah State Prison 
i found to be in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this 
er of Parole or Termination of Sentence is revoked and becomes null and void. 
5d this 2 0 t h "• day of Augus t 1980 
)rder of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this 2 1 s t day of August 19 80 . 
iced its decision in this matter to writing and hereby affix my signature as Executive Secretary for and on behalf 
ne State of Utah, Board of Pardons. f|fl - | | \ \ 1 ^ 
iv. Thomas i s convicted on any new fe lonies GAR>f L.QwEBSTER, Executive Secretary 
»r t h i s date (8-20-80) case to be 
sirred back to the Board. PAROLE AGREEMENT 
RICHARD THOMAS Hereby agree to abide by the following 
ditionsof my parole: 
1. I will make a written report, in person, to my Supervising Officer by the fifth day of each and every month, 
or more often if requested to do so. 
2. I will follow my Supervising Officer's instructions. 
3. I will submit to a search of my person, auto, place of residence of any other property under my control at 
any time of the day or night, without a warrant, upon reasonable cause, as ascertained by an agent of Adult 
Probation and Parole, to insure compliance with the conditions of parole. 
4. I will seek and maintain legitimate employment and/or participate in a program approved by my Supervising 
Officer. 
5. I will obey all local, State and Federal laws, and at all times conduct myself as a responsible, law-abiding 
citizen. I further agree to report any arrests or citations to my Supervising Officer within 72 hours of oc-
currence. 
6. I will abstain from the illegal use, possession or distribution of narcotics, dangerous drugs, controlled sub-
stances or related paraphernalia. I further agree to submit to urinalysis or other tests for narcotics or chemi-
cal agents upon the request of my Supervising Officer. 
7. I will not receive, possess, transport, or have under my control any firearm, explosive or other dangerous 
weapon. 
8. I will obtain written consent from Utah Adult Probation and Parole before leaving the State of Utah. It is 
expressly acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written authority from Adult Proba-
tion and Parole that I hereby waive extradition, from any state in which I may be found, to the State of 
Utah. 
9. I will inform my Supervising Officer of my intent to change employment residence. 
10. To avoid association with any person who has been convicted of a felony. 
11. I will abide by the following special conditions: 
I understand and agree that should I violate any of the above conditions, falsify reports required of me, or fail 
to follow the orders of my Supervising Officer, I shall be subject to arrest as provided by law. 
I have read, understand and agree to the above conditions and have received a copy of this agreement. 
WITNESSED BY: This day of 19 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF 
RICHARD THOMAS 
USP 013260 LAW AND 
ORDER 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the Board of Pardons, State of Utah, on this 20th day of August 
1980. The following Members of the Board were sitting: Mr, 
Thomas R. Harrison, Chairman, Mr. Jose I. Ferran, Jr., and Mr, 
Daily Oliver, Member. Also present was Mr. Alan Anthony, Hear-
ing Officer, Board of Pardons. Mr. David Bown, attorney-at-law, 
appearing as counsel for Mr. Richard Thomas. The parolee was 
previously given a written notice of the alleged parole vio-
lation and the date of this hearing. The Board having disclosed 
the evidence against the parolee, having allowed the parolee 
the opportunity to be heard, to present witnesses and documentary 
evidence, and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That RICHARD THOMAS was paroled from the Utah 
State Prison on the 12th day of February 1980. 
2* That complaint was made to the Board of Pardons by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, that the said 
RICHARD THOMAS had violated the conditions of his Parole. 
3. That RICHARD THOMAS was arrested on the 18th day 
of March 1980 and housed in the Davis County Jail. 
4. That RICHARD THOMAS waived his rights to a pre-
revocation hearing on April 21, 1980. 
5. That RICHARD THOMAS was scheduled for a parole vio-
lation hearing before the Board of Pardons on June 4, 1980, 
and at that time Mr. Thomas1 case was heard and it was the 
decision of the Board that the case be continued pending out-
come of Court Action. The case was continued to July 9, 1980. 
However, on July 9, 1980, Court action had not been completed 
and the Board continued the case without date. On July 17, 
1980, it was noted that Richard Thomas escaped from the Utah 
State Prison and was returned to the Utah State Prison on 
July 31, 1980. 
6. That RICHARD THOMAS on the 20th day of August 1980, 
appeared before the Board of Pardons and was charged with 
violation of his Parole in the following particulars: 
1. Having been convicted upon a plea of guilty 
to the charge of Aggravated Robbery, a 1st 
degree felony, on or about the 16th day of 
June, 1980 in the District Court of Davis 
County, State of Utah, in violation of Condition 
Number Six of his Parole Agreement. 
2. By having been convicted upon a plea of guilty 
to the charge of Aggravated Kidnapping, a 1st 
degree felony, on or about the 16th day of June 
1980, in the District Court of Davis County, 
State of Utah, with the sentence for said con-
viction to run consecutively with the sentence 
for the Aggravated Robbery conviction of the 
same date, in violation of Condition Number 
Six of his Parole Agreement. 
7. That RICHARD THOMAS was advised of his rights by the 
Board of Pardons on this 20th day of August 1980, and Mr. 
Thomas pled guilty to Counts #1 and #2. Based upon evidence 
presented to the Board and a commitment (Case $2-3340) 
on Counts $1 and 02 for the crimes of Aggravated Robbery 
(5 years - Life) and Aggravated Kidnapping (5 years - Life) 
sentences to run consecutively, the Board found probable 
cause to revoke the parole of RICHARD THOMAS. 
The Board having made the foregoing Findings of Fact 
hereby enters these: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That RICHARD THOMAS was lawfully paroled. 
2. That RICHARD THOMAS was charged with violation 
of his parole. 
3. That RICHARD THOMAS was afforded all of his 
Constitutional and Statutory rights and privileges. 
4. That RICHARD THOMAS did in fact violate his 
parole as shown above. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parole granted RICHARD 
THOMAS on the 12th day of February 1980, be and the same is 
hereby revoked as of the 20th day of August 1980, and a new 
parole release date granted, effective the 11th day of August 
1987. 
Dated this 20th day of August 1980. 
ITCtMkKK.^HARRISON ^ 
Chairman-Board of Pardons 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings and Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order to RICHARD THOMAS, Draper, Utah 
this ';** day of '•/, / .. .- . 198G. 
>/ 
' ' \ <* M J_ / L,-' 
NORMA A. DANNELS 
GARY(J-. WEBSTER 
Executive Secretary 
lorman H. Bif>9#f1#r 
Governor 
H.L (P«t«) Haun 
Chairman / ^ j 
\r-- s.*/ 
& * 
^ 
Donatd E. Blanchard 
MlchMl R. SJbb«t 
Curtis LGamar 
Cteryt Hanaan 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of 
the Alleged Parole 
Violation of RICHARD 
DEE THOMAS, USP #13260 
Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law PUBLIC 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
Board of Pardons on March 8, 1993. Board Members present were 
Curtis L. Garner and Donald E. Blanchard. Appearing for the 
State of Utah was Lori Lima, Deputy Attorney General, and Agent 
Michael Sorensen of Adult Probation and Parole. Parolee Richard 
Dee Thomas was presented and represented by counsel, James Lewis, 
Richard Dee Thomas was given written notice of the the 
allegations of parole violation and the date of this hearing. 
The Board, having disclosed the evidence against the parolee and 
having allowed the parolee the opportunity to be heard, to 
present witnesses and documentary evidence, and to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That RICHARD DEE THOMAS was paroled from the Utah State 
Prison on the 22nd day of September, 1992. 
2. That RICHARD DEE THOMAS was arrested on allegations of 
parole violation on or about the 6th day of October, 1992. 
3. That on the 8th day of March, 1993, RICHARD DEE THOMAS 
was brought before the Board of Pardons and charged with ^ 
violation of his parole in the following particulars: .*Tkt^ 
1) By having tailed to stabilize in the Ogden Community ^f\^\ 
Correctional Center program on October 6, 1992, in violation of /)(5\ v/jb' 
special condition number 5 of his parole agreement. J A /A ' 
6, 1992 
acrreement, 
2) By having failed to submit to urinalysis on October 
in violation of special condition number 3 of his oarole 
3) By having used, possessed, controlled, delivered, 
produced, manufactured, or distributed contolled substances or 
other drugs on or about October 6, 1992, in violation on 
condition number 3 of his parole agreement. 
4. That, RICHARD DEE THOMAS is not guilty of allegation 
number one and guilty of allegation number two. Allegation 
number three was dismissed by the Board on parolee's motion at 
the conclusion of the State's evidence, for lack of evidence. 
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Board hereby 
enters these: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That RICHARD DEE THOMAS was lawfully paroled. 
PUBLIC 
2. That RICHARD DEE THOMAS was charged with violation of his 
parole-
3. That RICHARD DEE THOMAS was afforded all of his 
Constitutional and statutory rights and privileges. 
4. That RICHARD DEE THOMAS did in fact.violate his parole. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parole granted RICHARD DEE THOMAS 
on the 22nd day of Novemberf 1992, be and the same is hereby 
revoked, and a new parole release date of April 13, 1993 is 
hereby granted with the following special conditions: 
1 Successfully complete ISP program. 
2 Successfully complete electronic monitoring. 
3 Submit to random drug testing. 
4 Successfully complete a substance abuse program. 
Dated this 10th day of March, 1993 
Board Member 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
O. L a n e M c C o t t e r 
Exccuuve Director 
C. Kim Thompson 
tor Institutional Operations 
•ty/**^ s ^ ^/- /?,£ 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
72* /fO)A/ /%y 7 ^ -
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
(801)571-2300 March 20, 1992 
Richard Dee Thomas #13260 
Uinta I I 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr. Thomas: 
You are instructed to process the complaints set forth in your 
January 23, 1992, letter to me through the appropriate grievance or 
classification procedure. As you are aware, these procedures 
facilitate the systematic collection and assessment of the relevant 
facts required to make an informed decision. 
It is our opinion that the Department has been exempted from the 
provisions of the "Administrative Procedures Act". Accordingly, your 
request for "Administrative Forms" will not be granted. The opinion 
expressed is based upon the following from U.C. 63-46b-l(2)(c): 
"The £TO 
related 
commutat 
terminat 
deci sion 
discharg 
jurisdic 
supervis 
visions of this chapter do not govern: state 
to extradition, to the granting of pardons o 
ions or terminations of sentences, or to the 
ion, or revocation of parole, or probation, 
s of the Psychiatric Security Review Board r 
e, conditional release, or retention of pers 
tion, to the discipline of, resolution of, g 
ion of, confinement of, or the treatment of" 
agency actions 
r parole, 
recision, 
to actions and 
elating to 
ons under its 
rievances of. 
inmates or 
r e s i d e n t s of any c o r r e c t i o n a l f a c i l i t y , the Utah S t a 
the Utah S t a t e Development Cen t e r , or persons in the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the D iv i s ion of Mental Hea l t h , or pe 
p roba t ion or p a r o l e , or j u d i c i a l review of those a c t i o n s 
(emphasis added) 
S i n c e r e l y , 
t e H o s p i t a l , 
custody or 
rsons on 
(0*>db*ji2i 
0. Lane McCotter , ^ c e c u t i v ^ ^ i r e c t o r 
Utah Department of Correct ion* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
fZV \M K% Cloo^ ~TUQ W\ Cr A 
Cit-5?) 
Defendant. 
V 
37-51 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
cjase No T > f t H » ^ 6 3 ^ 
Count No. L 
Honorable 
Clerk 
Reporter 
Bailiff 
Date A'ffift\ rq^gs 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason wpy sentence-
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted b v D a jury; D the court; aitflea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of , A t f g / i M p l - P r J — Q th4yv t V) ufofarYl^ ' . a felony 
of the - jy*^ degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by Q» rfnv\ and the State being represented by (^\^J&\d^J^t is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D n / a maximum mandatory term of 
Oknot to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
years and which may be for life; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_ to 
LT SU< tfip/A^PM^al Ex yerl such sentence is to run concurrently with ff ^yu^ 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)r 
"*r -AlA 
• r i mouon 01 u oiaie. u ueiense, u uoun, uouni(s)p are hereby dismissed/ 
\fmrfciAAfr (A \n WrrAsfP. r . r M i f V n k*Mo* .<*i\\ierf A\hJro. n(Arn^ 
rVdant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation In the D Defer 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adu l t 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached concHHons of probation. 
GO/Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County BUdfdelivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
ahd imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
LVCommitment shall issue - J n a d i l U i o i l ^ -
DATED this 32-n ay of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
I S T I ^ f T COURT JUDGE 
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e^ojy Page \ of 
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DOB 
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^L\Cv^x ' <- ? i 
Address 
3 </V/ 
.' ! v / H ^ 
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COMMITMENT 
After Judgment 
CRIMINAL NO. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
On the /> day of .,19 ^fO, the above 0 ^ 
named defendant was brought before a judge ofAhe Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
charged with having committed the crime of. 
The defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to ptiyafinnnft tind tn t?tnr 
—l\fCQr/if days in the Gotmly Jail with days in the jail to be suspended upuu puynwat of 
The fine has not been paid, nor secured, nor has an appeal been taken; 
You arc* hereby commanded to take said defendant Into custom1 I  v H 11 n I  'i ill t11 v k i" PJ > ii H 11111 f /" she shall Sn vc 
out the above-named term of imprisonment or shall pay S .. , _ , rr' to nxceed one dzy 
f o r 4m**h~- •• — — ruriine. 
Dated „•, E^J^TMYlA V _ ,11) 71 
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ADDENDUM F 
STATE v. 
CttcatMt TM 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
Richard Dee THOMAS, Defendant 
and Petitioner 
No §70049. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 22, 1998. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, William B. 
Bohling, J., of aggravated robbery. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed and certiorari was 
granted. The Supreme Court, Russon, J., 
held that (1) court commissioner could not 
constitutionally issue search warrant given 
that issuing search warrant was core judicial 
function involving ultimate judicial power, 
and (2) defendant inadequately briefed photo 
array issue. 
Reversed in part, affirmed in part and 
remanded 
1. Certiorari ^63.1 
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews 
decision of Court of Appeals,, not decision of 
trial court 
2. Certiorari e=»64(l) 
On certiorari, Supreme Court review*, 
Court of Appeals' decision for correctnesK 
and gives its conclusions of law no dpfervwi 
3. Officers and Public Employees ^ 4 3 
Under doctrine of Mde facto authority," 
actions performed by those without actual 
authority are validated when they are per-
formed by one who, under the color of law, 
assumes to exercise official authority, is re-
puted to have it and the community ac 
quiesces accordingly. 
Sec publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and ' 1 
initions. 
4. Court Commissioners *»3 
Courts e»100(l) 
Instant decision, holding that court com-
missioner does not have authority to issue 
THOMAS 
2*9 (ttth 1998) 
search warrant is prospective, and any prior 
search warrant issued by commissioner is 
valid under de facto doctrine, except that 
present defendant would be given benefit of 
his victory, in making his constitutional chal-
lenge. Const Art 8, § 1; U.CJU953, 78-3-
31,78-3-31(6)(a). 
5. Court Commissioners G=>3 
Holding in Ohms prohibiting court com-
missioners from performing core judicial 
functions did not deinstitutionalize court 
commissioners given that court commission-
ers are still able to perform many important 
functions in assistance to courts such as con-
ducting fact finding hearings, holding pretrial 
conferences, and making other recommenda-
tions to judges. Const Art 8, § 1; i l C A 
1:953, 78-3-31. 
6. Court Commissioners $=»3 
Issuance of search warrant is core judi-
cial function, which court commissioners lack 
authority to perform, though statute pui 
ports to give such authority to magistrates, 
which term includes commissioners, given 
that issuing search warrant could not be 
characterized as permissible functions of 
commissioner of either recommendation to 
judge or other action reviewable by judge, 
and, when judge issues law enforcement or-
der to search and seize, judge simultaneously 
exercises power and authority to enforce 
such order, and once armed with issued war-
rant, law enforcement proceeds to search and 
seize at will. Const Art. 8, § 1; U.C.A.1953, 
77-1.-3, 77-23-201, 78-8-81, 78-3-31 (6)(a). 
7. Court Commissioners £»3 
Core judicial functions can be performed 
only by duly appointed judges, and not by 
court commissioners, and thus, only duly ap-
pointed judges can issue search warrants. 
Const Art 8, § 1. 
riminal Law e=>1130(5) 
Due to defendant's lack of analysis, issue 
of whether trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress a positive eyewitness 
identification made from suspect photo array 
was inadequately briefed, and thus, Court of 
Appeals was justified in declining to address 
it Rules App.Proc., Rule 24(a)(9), 
3 0 0 U t a h JNii I'M ii i mi il 11 in 11 k i.ii >il M l '" 
9. Criminal Law C=»1130(61 
Reviewing court will not address argu-
ments that are not adequately briefed. 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 24(a)(9). 
10. Criminal Law e= 1130(5) 
While failure to cite to pertinent authori-
ty may not always render an issue inade-
quately briefed, it does so when the overall 
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift 
the burden of research and argument to the 
reviewing court Rules AppJProc, Rule 
24(a)(9). 
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Joanne C. Slotnik, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
Bel-Ami Demontreux, Salt Lake Cit} , for 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
On Certiorai I to the I Ita h Com t of l!l!ii pp eal s 
RUSSON, Justice: 
We granted certiorari to review the Utah 
Court of Appeals' decision that our holding in 
Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 PJ2d 844 (Utah 
1994) (prohibiting court commissioners from 
performing core judicial functions), does not 
apply to the issuance of a search warrant by 
a court commissioner. We are also asked to 
review the court of appeals' refusal to ad-
dress defendant's claim that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress a 
positive eyewitness identification made from 
a suspect photo array. The court of appeals' 
refusal was based upon inadequate briefing. 
State v. Thomas, No. 960170-CA, slip op. 
(CtApp. November 29, 1996) (memorandum 
decision), cert granted 937 P.2d 136 (Utah 
1997). We reverse as to the applicability of 
Ohms and affirm as to the refusal to address 
the photo array issue. 
On y ^ jujgiit of June 30, 1993, an armed 
robbery was committed at a fast food restau-
rant in Salt Lake County, Utah. At gun 
point, the assailant ordered the manager to 
put all the money into a bag and to accompa-
ny him to the parking lot The manager was 
then released, and the assailant ran away. 
Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived on 
the scene and began their investigation of the 
robbery. As part of their investigation, they 
received a lead on a suspect who was report-
ed to be in a nearby apartment. The suspect 
was defendant Richard Dee Thomas. When 
the police arrived at the apartment, a con-
frontation ensued with Thomas. The officers 
forced entry into the apartment but retreat-
ed after Thomas threatened to kill a hos-
tage.1 'Then, while some officers guarded the 
apartment, others went to obtain, a search 
warrant 
During the early morning of July 1, 1993, 
Third District Court Commissioner Frances 
M. Palacios issued a search warrant After 
obtaining the search warrant, the police offi-
cers returned to the scene. Shortly thereaf-
ter, Thomas surrendered, and the apartment 
was searched. During the search, the police 
seized evidence linking Thomas to the crime. 
On July 2, 1993, the manager of the restau-
rant was shown a photo array of six men and 
identified Thomas as the man who committed 
the robbery. During interrogation and after 
Thomas waived his Miranda rights, Thomas 
confessed to committing the armed robbery. 
On July 6, 1993, the State filed an informa-
tion against Thomas, charging him with ag-
gravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. 
Thomas pleaded not guilty. 
Prior to trial, Thomas moved to suppress 
evidence obtained during the search. Thom-
as cited Salt Lake City v. Ohms and argued 
that the issuance of a search warrant consti-
tutes a fundamental court function and thus 
the search and seizure were unconstitutional 
in that the court commissioner who issued 
the search warrant lacked the authority to do 
so. This motion was denied. Thomas also 
moved to suppress eyewitness identification, 
arguing, inter alia, that the photo array of 
the six men was unduly suggestive. This 
motion was also denied. On August 4, 1995, 
a jury convicted Thomas as charged. 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Thomas asserted, inter alia, that the trial 
court erred when it denied Thomas's motion 
I It latei turned out that there was no hostage. 
STATE v. 
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to suppress evidence and Ms motion to sup-
press eyewitness identification.. In an un-
published memorandum decision, the court of 
appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings. 
Thomas then petitioned this court for certio-
rari review, .and we granted the petition, 
ANALYSIS 
[1,2] "On certiorari, we review the deci-
sion of the court of appeals, not the decision 
of the trial court" State v. Harmon, 910 
?2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995). "We review the 
court of appeals* decision for correctness and 
give its conclusions of law no deference." 
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P2d 
M, 350 (Utah 1997), 
The first issue we address is whether the 
court of appeals erred when it held that Salt 
Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), 
did not apply to the issuance of a search 
warrant Before the court of appeals, Thom-
as argued that court commissioners do not 
have the authority to issue search warrants. 
In a rather scant summary disposition of the 
issue, the court of appeals disagreed, simply 
stating: 
Thomas relies on Salt Lake City v. Ohms 
for the proposition that "the Utah Su-
preme Court, on August 18,1994, held that 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-3-51 (1992), 
that gave to Utah court commissioners 
their powers was unconstitutional." In ad-
dition to having prospective application, 
Thomas's reading of Ohms is too broad 
and does not apply to the issuance of a 
search warrant 
Thomas, slip op. at 1 (citation omitted). 
Although the court of appeals should have 
elaborated to make its ruling more clear, the 
essence of its holding appears to be that (1) 
1 Utah Code Ann § 78-3-3l(6Xa) (1992) stated 
TTie court commissioner may accept pleas of 
guilty or no contest, impose sentence, and en-
ter final judgment in misdemeanor cases. 
Upon the informed consent of the defendant, 
the court commissioner may conduct a jury or 
nonjury misdemeanor trial in accordance with 
the law. Upon conviction, the commissioner 
may impose sentence and enter final judgment. 
The judgment entered by the commissioner 
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Ohms had prospective application and there-
fore was inapplicable U) Thomas's case be-
cause the search warrant pre-dated our rul-
ing in Ohms; (2) Thomas's assertion that 
court commissioners have no power was too 
broad a reading of Ohms since only the 
exercise of core judicial functions by court 
commissions was prohibited; and (3) Ohms 
did not apply because the issuance of a 
search warrant is not a core judicial function. 
We address these holdings in turn. 
[3] In Ohms, Ohms had "been charged 
with giving false or misleading information to 
a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 
§ 11.04.100. Ohms was tried, convicted, and 
sentenced by a court commissioner pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 7&-3-31(6)(a) (1992).* 
Ohms appealed to this court, arguing that a 
court commissioner did not have the authori-
ty to enter a final judgment of conviction and 
impose sentence, as such was an unconstitu-
tional exercise of ultimate judicial power. 
We agreed and held that court commission-
ers cannot exercise a judge's ultimate judicial 
power or, in othei words, cannot perform 
core judicial functions. In so holding, we 
found significant the fact that "[cjourt com-
missioners are employees of the judiciary, 
not duly appointed judges," and that commis-
sioners are not subject to the "constitutional 
checks and balances" to which duly appointed 
judges are subject Ohms, 881 P.2d at 851. 
We thus found section 78-3-31(6)(a) uncon-
stitutional because it delegated the core judi-
cial functions of entering final judgment and 
imposing sentence to a court commissioner. 
Under the doctrine of de facto authority,3 we 
validated the past actions of court commis-
sioners who had engaged in the unconstitu-
tional exercise of core judicial functions, 
shall be the final judgment of the coin i fi i all 
| imposes, including appeal. 
3. Under this doctrine, actions performed by 
those without actual authority are validated 
when they are performed by one who, under the 
color of law, " 'assumes to exercise official au-
thority, is reputed to have it, and the community 
acquiesces accordingly.'" Ohms, S81 P.2d at 
854 (quoting Hussey v. Smith, 99 U.S. 20, 24, 25 
L.Ed. 314(1878)). 
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I Prospective. Application 
[4] Given only 'the court of appeals'1 con-
clusive statement, we assume that it agreed 
with the State's argument that Thomas was 
precluded from challenging commissioner ac-
tions because we limited Ohms to prospective 
application and the search warrant was is-
sued some fourteen months prior to Ohms. 
Indeed, a review of the record reveals that 
the search warrant was issued on July 1, 
1993, over thirteen months prior to the Ohms 
decision. However, while we stated in Ohms 
that "actions taken by commissioners in the 
past are not subject to challenge since court 
commissioners in those cases acted with de 
facto authority," we declined to apply the de 
facto doctrine to Ohms as he had "sustained 
the burden of attacking an unconstitutional 
statute." To hold otherwise and deprive an 
appellant of "the fruits of victory" would have 
the effect of "discouraging challenges to stat-
utes of questionable validity." Ohms, 881 
P.2d at 854-55. In the case before us, by 
arguing that the issuance of a search warrant 
m a core judicial function, Thomas, like 
Ohms, is attacking the constitutionality of a 
court commissioner's exercise of power. 
Thus, if Thomas sustains 'this burden, and we 
hold that he does, then the de facto doctrine 
would not apply to him for the same reasons 
it did not apply to Ohms. As in Ohms, our 
decision today is prospective, and any search 
warrants issued by court commissioners in 
the past are valid, as they were issued with 
de facto authority. Id. 
B The Power of Court Commissioners 
[5] Thomas argued before the com of 
appeals that our decision in Ohms held sec-
tion 78-3-31 unconstitutional and thus "de-
constitutionalized court commissioners." 
The court of appeals dismissed this argument 
as going beyond what was actually held in 
Ohms. The court of appeals is correct In 
Ohms, we clearly stated that section 78-^ 3-31 
violated the Utah Constitution "to the extent 
that it purports to vest ultimate judicial pow-
er of courts of record in persons who have 
not been duly appointed as article VIII 
judges." Id. at 855 (emphasis added). We 
also acknowledged that court commissioners 
"may perform many important functions in 
assistan.ce to courts" such as conducting fact 
finding hearings, holding pretrial confer-
ences, and making other recommendations to 
judges. In fact, we specifically stated that 
"our decision in no way affects the authority 
and functions that court commissioners have 
eitfoyed for over thirty years and will un-
doubtedly continue to er\joy in the future." 
Id. at 851-52 n. 17. Nowhere in Ohms did we 
"deconstitutionalize" the court commissioner 
system. 
C Issuance of a Search Warrant 
as a Core Judicial Function 
I ru court of appeals also held that Ohms 
did nc, apply because the issuance of a 
search warrant is not a core judicial function. 
This is a question of first impression. 
In Ohms, we stated that core judicial func-
tions include (1) "the power to hear and 
determine controversies between adverse 
parties and questions in litigation/ " (2)" the 
authority to hear and determine justiciable 
controversies/ " (3)" the authority to enforce 
any valid judgment decree or order'" and 
(4) "all powers that are 'necessary to protect 
the fundamental integrity of the judicial 
branch/ " Id at 849 (citations omitted) (em-
phasis added). Core judicial functions do not 
include functions that are generally designed 
to "assist" courts, such as conducting fact 
finding hearings, holding pretrial confer-
ences, and making recommendations to 
judges. In these instances, the commission-
ers' actions are reviewable by a judge; thus, 
ultimate judicial power remains with the 
.judge Id. at 851 n. 17 
[6] Turning to the present case, it is well 
established that a search warrant is an order. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201 (1995) (de-
fining search warrant as "an order issued by 
a magistrate in the name of the state and 
directed to a peace officer," describing the 
search and property to be seized); 1933 Re-
vised Statutes of Utah § 105-54-1 (stating 
that "[a] search warrant is an order in writ-
ing, in the name of the state, signed by a 
magistrate and directed to a peace officer, 
commanding him to search for personal prop-
erty and bring it before the magistrate"), 
quoted in Allen v. Holbrook 103 Utah 319, 
135 P2d 242, 247-48 (1943); see also 79 
STATE v. 
Cite u 9*1 PJd 
fXS. Searches and Seizures § 128 (1995). 
When a judge issues to law enforcement an 
order to search and seize, the judge simulta-
neously exercises the power and authority to 
enforce such an order, because once armed 
with an issued warrant, law enforcement pro-
ceeds to search and seize at will. Thus, 
because a search warrant is an order and the 
i^ uer possesses the authority to enforce the 
order, the issuance of a search warrant is a 
core judicial function, which commissioners^ 
lack the authority to perform. 
This holding is buttressed by the fact that 
the right to be free from unreasonable 
marches and seizures embodied in the Utah 
and United States Constitutions4 is one of 
the most fundamental and cherished rights 
we possess. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 
l\S. 753, 758,105 S.Ct 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 
<19S5) ("The Fourth Amendment protects 
... 'the right to be let alone—the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men.'" (quoting Olmstead v. 
Vmted States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct 
5«. 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting))); Camara v. Municipal <X 387 
US. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 
1967) ("The Fourth Amendment thus gives 
concrete expression to a right of the people 
which is 'basic to a free society.'" (quoting 
'Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct 
1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949))); Harris v. Unit-
ed States, 331 U.S. 145,150, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 
LEd. 1399 (1947) ("This Court has consis-
tently asserted that the rights of privacy and 
personal security protected by the Fourth 
Amendment'... are to be regarded as of the 
very essence of constitutional liberty; and 
that the guaranty of them is as important 
and as imperative as are the guaranties of 
the other fundamental rights of the individu-
al citizen . . . . '" (quoting Gouled v. Untied 
States, 255 U.S. 298, 304, 41 S.Ct 261, 65 
LEd. 647 (1921))), overruled in part by Chi- . 
»>W v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct 
3»4< 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Given the mag-
nitude of the right at risk when a search 
* The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which is practically identical to ar-
ticle I. section 14 of the Utah Constitution, states: 
flie right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
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warrant is issued, we have no difficulty in 
granting the issuance of a search warrant 
core function status. 
[7] The State proffers two arguments as 
to why court commissioners have the authori-
ty to issue search warrants. First, the State 
claims that commissioner authority to issue 
search warrants stems from their status as 
magistrates, who possess the clear statutory 
_ grant of power to issue search warrants. 
Section 77-1-3 does define a magistrate as "a 
justice or judge of a court of record or not of 
record or a commissioner of such a court 
appointed in accordance with Section 78-3-
31," and section 78-7-17.5(1 )(c) does vest au-
thority in magistrates to 'issue . . . warrants 
of search." However, as we have outlined 
above, Ohms held that under the Utah, Con-
stitution core judicial functions can be per-
formed only by duly appointed judges. 
Thus, in accordance with our holding today, 
only duly appointed judges can issue search 
warrants. Court commissioners are not 
judges, and thus they cannot issue search 
warrants. Any attempt by the legislature to 
statutorily confer the power to issue search 
warrants upon court commissioners would be 
null and void as a violation of the Utah 
Constitution. We do not hold the above-
stated statutes unconstitutional, however, be-
cause section 78-7-17.5(1) clearly grants 
magistrates the power to issue search war-
rants, "[ejxeept as otherwise provided by 
law." 
Second, the State argues that the issuance 
of a search warrant is not a core judicial 
function involving the exercise of ultimate 
judicial power but rather involves a nonadju-
dicative preliminary matter that simply as-
sists the court in moving the case along. 
Certainly, many Actions are capable of "as-
sisting" courts, including the performance of 
core judicial functions. Thus, determining 
whether a particular action assists a court 
does not end the inquiry, As we have noted, 
.functions that commissioners can constitu-
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
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tionally perform air I how that constitute 
recommendations or other functions that are 
reviewable by a judge. Issuing a search 
warrant cannot be characterized as either a 
recommendation or an action that is reviewa-
ble by a judge. The commissioner in this 
case did not recommend to the judge that the 
warrant be issued but rather issued it her-
self. Similarly, the decision to issue was not 
subject to review by a judge with the possi-
bility of disallowing the search. Rather, the 
order to search and seize was issued and 
then executed immediately thereafter. Fur-
thermore, while the issuance of a search 
warrant is a "preliminary" decision when 
looking at a criminal prosecution as a whole, 
it is a final decision as to whether a search 
will occurT'Thus, while issuing a search war-
rant does not rise to the level of finality as 
entering judgment and imposing sentence, as 
was disallowed in Ohms, it is sufficiently final 
to establish it as a core judicial function. We 
thus hold that because the issuance of a 
search warrant is a core judicial function, 
which cannot be performed by a court com-
missioner, the court of appeals erred when it 
held that Ohms did not apply. 
Thomas also objects to a court commission-
er presiding over his first appearance. He 
argues that, similar to issuing a search war-
rant, presiding over a first appearance is a 
core judicial function that commissioners lack 
the authority to perform. However, Thomas 
fails in his brief to identify or describe this 
hearing or discuss what the commissioner's 
actions were and how these actions constitut-
ed the exercise of core judicial functions. 
Thomas cited only to the Third Circuit 
Court's docket sheet stating that a first ap-
pearance took place. A review of the record 
reveals no further evidence of the first ap-
pearance. It does show, however, that 
Thomas's preliminary hearing was held be-
fore Circuit Court Judge Phillip K. Palmer 
and that it was he who bound Thomas over 
for trial in Third District Court Rule 
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure requires an appellant's argument to 
contain the "reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented . . . with cita-
tions to the . . . parts of the record relied 
on." Thomas has failed to comply with these 
requirements. Hi* brief m totally inu'iif-
quali1 unci uiffTiliniM we derlint U> address 
this issue, 
II 
[8] The second 'issue we address is 
whether the court of appeals erred when it 
declined to address Thomas's claim that the 
trial court erred in denying .'his motion to 
suppress a positive eyewitness identification 
made from a suspect photo array because 
Thomas failed to adequately brief the issue. 
The court of appeals stated: 
Thomas ignores several decisions address 
ing proper challenges to photo array cases. 
See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111 
(Utah 1994); State v. Thamer, 111 P2d 
432, 435 (Utah 1989). Because Thomas 
fails to adequately brief this argument, it is 
without merit and we decline to address it 
See Utah R-App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring "ti 
tations to the authorities [and] statutes 
relied on"). 
Thomas, slip op. at 3. 
A review of the record reveals that Thorn 
as devoted four pages of his brief before the 
court of appeals to his photo array argument 
However, almost three of these pages con 
sisted of direct quotes from the trial tran-
script On the basis of the trial testimony, 
Thomas then asserted that the photo arraj 
was overly suggestive. His only reference to 
any legal authority is contained in the bald 
assertions that the 
identification also taints any other identifi-
cation of Mr. Thomas in violation of due 
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution. The overly suggestive photo array 
also violates Art I, § 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution (Due process); *ee also State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
These statements concluded his argument 
[9] It 'is well established that a reviewing 
court will not address arguments that are 
not adequately briefed. State v. Herrem 
895 PJ2d 359, 368 n. 5 (Utah 1995) (refusing 
to address defendant's state due process ar-
gument where argument entailed only super-
ficial statement concerning Utah's unique 
history and reference to another part of de 
VALCARCE v. 
Cit«af96] T2d 
fendant's brief); State v. Wareham, 772 PJ2d 
960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to rule on, 
issue where defendant's brief "wholly 
lack[ed] legal analysis and authority to sup-
port his argument"); State v. Amicone, 689 
?2d 1341,1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to rule 
on separation of powers argument where ar-
gument was not supported by any legal anal-
ysis or authority). 
In deciding whether an argument has been 
adequately briefed, we look to the standard 
set forth in rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This rule states that 
the argument in the appellant's brief "shall 
contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues present-
ed ... with citations to the authorities, stat-
utes and parts of the record relied on." Im-
plicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald 
citation to authority but development of that 
authority and reasoned analysis based on 
that authority, We have previously stated 
that this court is not" 'a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research.*" State v Bishop, 
753 ?M 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Wil-
liamson v. Opsahl 92 IU.App.3d 1087, 48 
IlLDec. 510, 511, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)). 
FITZGERALD 
303 (Utah 1998) 
i r i 305 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of ap-
peals' holding that Salt Lake City v. Ohms 
does not apply to the issuance of a search 
warrant Issuing a search warrant is a core 
judicial function involving ultimate judicial 
power. We remand the case to the court of 
appeals for a determination as to whether the 
trial court's failure to suppress evidence ob-
tained from the search constituted reversible 
error. We further affirm the court of ap-
peals' holding that Thomas inadequately 
briefed the photo array issue. 
HOWE, C J., DURHAM, Associate C J., 
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur in Justice RUSSON's opinion. 
[10] In his brief to the court of appeals, 
Thomas did rite to the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion, to article I, section 7 of the Utah Consti-
tution, and to the case of State v. Ramirez. 
However, this is all he did. Analysis of what 
this authority requires and of how the facts 
of Thomas's case satisfy these requirements 
was 'wholly lacking. The court of appeals. 
also noted, "Thomas ignores several decisions 
addressing proper challenges to photo array 
cases." Thomas, slip op. at 3. While failure 
to cite to pertinent authority may not always 
render an issue inadequately briefed, it does 
so when the overall analysis of the issue is so 
lacking as to shift the burden of research and 
argument to the reviewing court Because of 
Thomas's lack of analysis, the photo array 
issue was inadequately briefed and the court 
of appeals was justified in declining to ad-
dress it 
.
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DAV 11 i j n a g e i 
This case is befoi e us on i: emand from, the Utah Supreme 
Court. £££ State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998). The sole 
issue is "whether the trial court•s failure to suppress evidence 
obtained from""'the [illegal] search constituted reversible error " 
Id,, at 3 05. We hoi d that i t does not. 
Because the invalid search amounts to a violation of a 
federally protected constitutional right, "we will affirm, 
defendant's conviction only if we can. say, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, tha t defendant would still have been convicted even 
if the trial court had not admitted the improperly seized 
evidence." State v. Genovesi, 909 P. 2d 916, 922 (Utah, Ct App 
1995). The evidence seized pursuant to the search was the 
baseball cap, sunglasses, gun, and bank bags with some coin 
wrappers and gift certificates. Had this evidence been 
suppressed, the jury had before it a positive and unequivocal 
eyewitness identification from the store manager who had spent: 
several, minutes studying defendant's face while in the store, and 
had come .face-to-face with defendant several times while 
defendant forced the manager across the store parking lot. ft 
neighbor immediately next-door to the apartment at which 
defendant had been staying directed the police to the apartment. 
Upon arrival; the police we;. ~* ;, . ?.*-. defendant inside <-r d 
confirmed the neighbor's report that a T.&XI matching r' 
description given b> the Kentucky Fried Chicken employees was 
there. Trie police guarded the apartment until defendant emerged, 
Most importantly, defendant's voluntary and uncoerced confession 
that he had committed the robbery was also befoie the ^urv 
ComL o^.*:e. pursuant :ne warrant • vicer.ce 
the overall s1 -.:jr - the prosecution's case, we hold that the 
admission of the seized evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt because "the evidence that was erroneously admitted did 
not significantly contribute to defendant's conviction and other 
properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly established his guilt." 
med 
909 P 2d at 923 
Jame , DavisCyy 
f^x^ 
WE CONCH 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Quk&DW- Site*?*) 
fc<Tudith M, B i11 ings, Judge 
1 We note the exemplary conduct- of the police in this matter 
and that the "error" could not have been reasonably ant:icipahitari 
by either :;:•<- police c-r the rria^ , court, 
2. Because .: f - .- disposition, */e ;.. ,ot reach the State's 
argument that exclusion of the sei2**.i evidence is an 
inappropriate remedy. See State v. Carter, 776 P. 2d 886 tUtari 
1989). We find defendant's jurisdictional arguments, including 
those styled -v •, "Motion/Memorandum for Appointment of Counsel," 
without merit and decline to address them, see idT f and issuance 
of this decision renders defendant's "Motion for an Expedited 
Decision of Appeal" moot. Lastly, even if we assume defendant's 
"Affidavit for Change of Venue[] and Prejudice" is a proper 
pleading, it is without merit and we do not reach the issues 
raised therein. See id. 
2 
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The United States r. Ferreira. 
, ; . \ law, designate the persons to fill these offices. 
T , : ; Le the construction of the Constitution, then as 
vu .:tiirrnated could not act in a judicial character aa> 
,, %.. as" a commissioner, because he was not appointed 
- \ :,-, ?'r —,ient, everv thing that has been done under the 
. ••• \*'S/,. and 1834, and 1849, would be void, and the 
paviuuiiis heretofore made might be recovered back b\-
the United States. But this question has not been made: 
nor does it arise in the case. It could arise only in a suit 
bv the United States to recover back the money. And 
/
 9~l *as the case does not present it, and the parties l
'
,<w
-l interested are not before the court, and these laws 
have for so many years been acted on as valid and constitu-
te-rial we do not think it proper to express an opinion upon 
i:. In the case at bar, the power of the judge to decide in 
tne first instance, is assumed on both sides, and the contro-
versy has turned upon the power of the Secretary to revise 
it; and it is in this aspect of the case, that it has been con-
sidered by the court, in the foregoing opinion. 
The appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 
ORDER. 
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the 
record from the District Court%of the United States for the 
Northern District of Florida, and was argued by counsel. On 
consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and 
decreed by this court, that this cause be, and the same is 
hereby dismissed for the want of jurisdiction. 
NOTE BT THE CHIEF JUSTICE, INSERTED BY OltDER OF THE COURT. 
Since the aforegoing opinion wa« delivered, the attention of the court lias 
been drawn to the case of the United States v. Yale Todd.1 which arose under 
Tl iict of 1792, and was decided in the Supreme Court, February 17, 17i>4. 
J here was no official reporter at that time, and this case has not been printed. 
It shows the opinion of the court upon a question which was left in doubt bv 
the opinions of the different judges, stated in the note to Hat/hum's ease. 
And as the subject is one of much interest, and concerns the nature and ex-
tent of judicial power, the substance of the decision in Yaie Todd's case is 
inserted here, in order that it may not be overlooked, if similar questions 
should hereafter arise. 
The 2d, 3d, and 4th sections of the act of 1792, were repealed at the next 
session of Congress by the act of February 28, 1703. It was these three sec 
tions that pave rise to the questions stated in the note to llatibuni's case. 
The repealing act provided another mode for takinp testimony, and deciding 
upon the validity of claims to the pensions granted by the former Jaw; unii 
by the 3d section it saved all rights to pensions which might be founded 
1
 REVIEWED. Florida v. Gcorqiu, 17 How., 505. 
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3on any legal adjudication," under the act of 1792, and made it the duty 
the Secretary of War, in conjunction with the Attorney-General, to take 
li measures as might be necessary to obtain an adjudication of the Supreme 
irr, "on the validity of such rights, claimed under the act aforesaid, by the 
srminaiion of certain persons styling- themselves commissioners." 
t appears from this case, that Chief "Justice Jay and Justice Cushing: acted 
n their construction of the act of 1792, immediately after its passage and 
:>re it was repealed. And the saving and proviso, in the act of 1793, was 
lifestly occasioned by the difference of opinion upon that question which 
itcd among the justices, and was introduced for the purpose of having it 
^rmtned, whether under the act conferring the power upon the Circuit 
ins, the judges of those courts when refusing for the reasons assigned by 
m to acts as courts, could leg-ally act as commissioners out of court. If 
decision of the judges, as commissioners, was a legal adjudication, then 
party's riirht to the pension allowed him was saved; otherwise not. 
n pursuance of this act of Congress, the case of Yale Todd was brought 
3re the Supreme Court, in an amicable action, and upon a case stated at 
iruary Term, 1704. 
he case was docketed by consent, the United States being plaintiff and 
Id the defendant. The declaration was for one hundred and seventy-two 
ars and -ninety-one cents, for so much money had and received by the de-
iant to the use of the United States; to which the defendant pleaded non 
'in p.sit. 
EThe case as stated, admitted that on the 3d of May, 1792. the de- ,-
 f 
lant appeared before the Hon. John Jay, "William Cushing, and ' 
hard Law, then being judges hi the Circuit Court held at New Haven, for 
District of Connecticut, then and there sitting, and claiming to be com-
moners under the act of 1792, and exhibited the vouchers and testimony 
how his right under that law to be placed on the pension list; and that the 
jes above named, being judges of the Circuit Court, and then and there 
n<; at New Haven, in and for the Connecticut District, proceeded, as com-
doners designated in the said act of Congress, to take the testimony offered 
Todd, which is set out at large in the statement, together with their opinion 
Todd ought to be placed on the pension list, and paid at the rate of two 
d> of his former monthly wages, which they understood to have been eight 
ars and one third per month, and the sum of one hundred and fifry dol-
for arrears. 
he case further admits, that the certificate of their proceedings and opin-
, and the testimony they had taken, were afterwards, on the oth of May, 
2. transmitted to the Secretary of War, and that by means thereof Todd 
placed on the pension list, and had received from the United States one 
dred and fifty dollars for arrears, and twenty-two dollars and ninety-one 
's claimed for his pension aforesaid, said to be due on the 2d of Scptcm-
1792. 
Vnd the parties agreed that if upon this statement the said judges of the 
•nit Court sitting as commissioners, and not as a Circuit Court, hail power 
authority by virtue of said act so to order and adjudge of and concern-
the premises, that then judgment should be given for the defendant, 
Twi>c for the United States, for one hundred and seventy-two dollars and 
tv-onc cents, and six cents cost. 
he case was argued by Bradford, Attorney-General for the United States, 
Hillhouse for the defendant; and the judgment of the court was rendered 
:ivor of the United States for the sum above mentioned, 
hief Justice Jay and Justice Cushing, Wilson, Blair, and Patcrson, were 
ent at the decision. No opinion was filed stating the grounds of the deci-
. Nor is any dissent from the judgment entered on the record. It would 
ii. therefore, to have been unanimous, and that Chief Justice Jay and Jus-
Cu>hin^ became satisfied, on further reflection, that the power given in 
act of 17!':: to the Circuit Court a< a court, could not be construed to uivc 
1
 the judges out of court as commissioners. It must be admitted thaf the 
SUPREUE COURT. 
Barrow r. 41 ill. 
justice of the claims and the meritorious character of the claimant* would 
appear to have exercised some influence on their judgments in the first in-
stance, and to have Jed thera to prive a construction to the law which its Ian-
truaire would hardly justify upon the most liberal rules of interpretation. 
'liie result of the opinions expressed by the judges of the Supreme Court 
of that dnv in the note to Unvaunt's case, and in the case of the L'mtid Statts 
v. Todd, is this : 
1. That the power proposed to be conferred on the Circuit Courts of the 
United States by the act of 17D2 was not judicial power within the meaning:, 
of the Constitution, and was, therefore, unconstitutional, and could not law-
fully be exercised by the courts. 
*i. That as the act of Congress intended to confer the power on the courts 
as a judicial function, it could not be construed as an authority to the judees 
composing the court to exercise the power out of court in the character of 
commissioners. 
o. That money paid under a certificate from persons not authorized by law 
to pive it, might be recovered back by the United States. 
The case of Todd was docketed by consent in the Supreme Court; and the 
court appears to have been of opinion that the act of Congress of 1 TUG, 
directing the Secretary of "War and Attorney-General to take their opinion 
upon the question, gave them original jurisdiction. In the early days of the 
Government, the right of Congress to give original jurisdiction to the Supreme 
Court, in cases not enumerated in the Constitution, was maintained by many 
jurists, and seems to have been entertained by the learned judges who decided 
Todd's case. But discussion and more mature examination has settled the 
question otherwise; and it has long been the established doctrine, and we be-
lieve now assented to by all who have examined the subject, that the original 
jurisdiction of this court is confined to the cases specified in the Constitution, 
and that Congress cannot enlarge it. In all other cases its power must be 
appellate. 
* - , - , *I\OBEKT R. BAKECNV, PLAINTIFF IX EDITOR, r. 
0
 J NATHANIEL B. HILL. 
"Where the only exceptions taken in the court below were to the refusals of 
the court to continue the case to the next term; and it appears that the 
continuance asked for below and the suing out the writ of error were only 
for the purpose of delaying the payment of a just debt, and no counsel ap-
peared in this court on that side, the 17th rule will be applied and the 
judgment of the court below be affirmed with ten per cent, interest.1 
THIS ease was brought up, by writ of error, from the Cir-
cuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana. 
Hill was a citizen of South Carolina, and sold two slaves to 
Barrow, a citizen of Louisiana. Barrow gave his note for 
£2.000, dated 12th of February, 1848, payable twelve months 
after date. When due, it was protested. Hill then filed his 
petition in the Circuit Court of the United States. Barrow's 
58 
1
 See note to Sims v. Hundley, 6 How., 1. 
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Cite as 886 P.2d 513 (Utah 1994) 
in violation of Utah Constitution. U.C.A. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 1953, 78-3-31(6); Const. Ait. S. § 1. 
v. 
Jeffery L. TAYSOM, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 930552. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Defendant was convicted in a Third Cir-
cuit, Salt Lake County, J. Patrick Casey. 
Commissioner, for misdemeanor child abuse. 
and he appealed. The Supreme Court. Zim-
merman, C.J., held that statute empowering 
court commissioners, upon consent of defen-
dant, to conduct misdemeanor trials, impose 
sentence, and enter final judgments of con-
viction delegated judicial power of State of 
Utah to nonjudges in violation of Utah Con-
stitution. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Greenwood, J., filed concurring opinion. 
Stewart, Associate C.J., concurred in re-
sult. 
Constitutional Law C=>60 
Court Commissioners c=>3 
Statute empowering court commission-
ers, upon consent of defendant, to conduct 
misdemeanor trials, impose sentence, and en-
ter final judgments of comiction delegated 
judicial power of State of Utah to nonjudges 
1. Child abuse, as defined in Utah Code Ann 
§ 76-5-109(2)(c), is a clas, A misdemeanor 
2. We note that the circumstances surrounding 
our decision today are somewhat unusual This 
case was argued after the retirement of former 
Chief Justice Hall and before Justice Russon was 
confirmed by the Utah Senate Judge Green-
wood of the Utah Court of Appeals sat to fill the 
vacancy on the court After Justice Russon s 
confirmation, the court heard arguments in Salt 
Lake Citx v Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994) 
Although three members of the Taxsom panel— 
myself, Justice Durham, and Judge Greenwood— 
vvould vote to uphold section 76-3-31(6) of the 
Utah Code, the decision to the contrary reached 
by three permanent members of this court in 
Ohms controls 
3
- In Ohms, 881 P 2d at 853-55, a majority of this 
court validated the past actions of commissioners 
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen.. Joanne C. Slotnik. 
Asst. Atty. Gen.. Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Charles F. Loyd, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant. 
Jeffery L. Taysom appeals his 1992 jury 
conviction for misdemeanor child abuse l and 
the subsequent entry of a final judgment of 
conviction and imposition of sentence by a 
court commissioner. Taysom attacks section 
78-3-31(6) of the Code, which empowers 
court commissioners, upon consent of the 
defendant, to conduct misdemeanor trials. 
impose sentence, and enter final judgments 
of comiction. According to Taysom. this 
provision delegates "the judicial power of the 
state of Utah" to nonjudges in \iolation of 
article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. The Utah Court of Appeals certified 
Taysom's appeal to this court pursuant to 
rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. 
Although I continue to adhere to the view 
that section 78-3-31(6) is constitutional. Salt 
Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 863 (Utah 
1994) (Durham, J., & Zimmerman, C.J., dis-
senting), a majority of the permanent mem-
bers of this court have concluded otherwise.2 
Id. at 855. Accordingly, on the basis of 
Ohms,3 we vacate Taysom's conviction and 
under the "de facto judge" doctrine Under this 
theory, the actions of a de facto judge are valid 
unless a party objects to the "judge's" exercise of 
power at trial State ex rel. Smith v Starke 
Circuit Court, 275 Ind. 483, 417 N E.2d 1115. 
1124 (1981) Under a strict reading of the de 
facto authority doctrine, the defendant m Ohms 
would not benefit from the rule of law set out in 
that case because he never objected to the au-
thority of the commissioner at trial. See id 
Nevertheless, this court held that "it would be 
unconscionable to depnve Ohms, who has sus-
tained the burden of attacking an unconstitution-
al statute, of the fruits of victory " Ohms, 881 
P.2d at 854-55 The majority relied heavily on 
our decision in Labrum v Utah State Board of 
Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 914 (Utah 1993), in 
reaching this result In Labrum, this court held 
Dec. 1, 1994. ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Cltrk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 940903104 
This matter was randomly assigned to Judge Hanson who in turn 
referred the matter to Judge Murphy, the presiding judge, in 
accordance with Section 77-6-4, Utah Code Ann. Petitionees filing 
invokes Section 77-6-1, et seq. , Utah Code Ann. for the removal of 
members of the Board of Pardons. The statutory provisions invoked, 
however, are applicable for the removal of justices of the peace or 
officers of a city, county or other political subdivision of the 
state. Members of the Board of Pardons are gubernatorial 
appoinrees and do nor fall within the category of officials who can 
be removed under the statues invoked. 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed with 
prejudice and no referral for prosecution will be made. 
Dated this is .day of June, 1994. 
MICHAEL R. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
THOMAS V. BD. OF PARDONS PAGE TWO ORDER 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order, to the following, this *3 dav of June, 1994: 
Richard Dee Thomas 
Pro se 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Utah Board of Pardons 
448 East 6400 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Today is a voluntary no-drive 
day in Salt Lake, Davis and 
Weber counties. 
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Most WVC Residents Content 
Survey shows folks 
satisfied with police, 
public works, image 
BY REBECCA WALSH 
THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE 
WEST VALLEY CITY — After 61 
years of watching history unfold west 
of the Jordan River, 85-year-old Vern 
Breeze figures it is time his hometown 
moved beyond its inferiority complex. 
"I don't tnmK we ought to be self-
conscious anymore," Breeze said. 
Apparently, most West Valley City 
residents agree with him. According 
to a recent Dan Jones & Associates 
poll, most West Valley City residents 
are satisfied — with police response 
times, the city's 2-year-old fitness cen-
ter, even the city's image. 
They are complacent, even. Nearly 
one-fourth of 400 residents polled in 
June could not pick one major 
improvement to make life in West 
Valley City better. Another 19 percent 
were unable to choose the "most im-
portant" issue facing the city. 
Jones says that means they are 
content. "Many people used to worry 
about your image," he told City Coun-
cil members Tuesday. "You couldn't 
have gotten a better report card." 
City Manager John Patterson was a 
little giddy. 
"This is phenomenal," he said. 
"Time and again, people — CAVE 
people, Citizens Against Virtually 
Everything — question our focus on 
big projects like the E Center, Hale 
Center Theater, the fitness center. 
"This poll shows we have stuck to 
the knitting. We have stuck to what is 
essentially the role of local govern-
ment: It's public works. It's public 
safety. It's providing services to the 
citizens." 
Since 1993, West Valley City has 
hired Jones to survey residents on is-
sues ranging from crime to recreation. 
See WVC, Page D-4 
